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INTRODUCTION

Few sports law issues attract fan interest like disputes over
player restraints in professional sports. In the past fifteen years,
player-club conflicts concerning reserve systems,, free agency, and
salary arbitration have drawn considerable attention.' Players
manifest an increased willingness to carry their grievances to the
judicial arena.2 Many of the traditional restraints have been significantly altered or fallen by the wayside, s often the targets of player
4
antitrust suits.
1. See J. WEISTART & C. LOWELL, THE LAW OF SPORTS 500 n.154 (1979 and 1985 supplement at 82 n.154)(cases and law review articles cited therein). See also Maisel, Ball Park
Figures? Better Believe It, SP. ILLUSTRATED, Mar. 4, 1985, at 22.
2. See NFL Players Return to Court, N.Y. Times, Dec. 30, 1987, at 39, col. 1;
Goldpaper, Players' Union Calls for Talks to End NBA Labor Impasse, N.Y. Times, Jan.
20, 1988, at 52, col. 1; Goldpaper, NBA Players Sue League, N.Y. Times, Oct. 2, 1987, at 43,
col. 4.
3. See infra notes 91-192 and accompanying text.
4. The antitrust laws are codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1982)(the Sherman Act) and 15
U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1982)(the Clayton Act). Section one of the Sherman Act provides that
"le]very contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint
of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be
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Athletes such as Curt Flood,' Leon Woods and baseball players alleging owner collusion in the free agent market 7 have sought
or threatened to seek judicial relief from their traditional bondage.
Since the formation of player unions in the late 1960s and early
1970s, the players have taken an active role in seeking the promised land of competitive bidding for their services.' The most recent player restraint case, Wood v. National Basketball Associaillegal . . . . Section two states that [e]very person who shall monopolize, or attempt to
monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any
part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be
" Under the Sherman Act, the focus is on agreement between
deemed guilty of a felony ..
those charged with a violation. In baseball, for example, players could prove that the owners
had an agreement to restrain bidding for player services, they might prevail under section
one of the Sherman Act.
Language throughout Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469 (1940), implies that the
antitrust statutes are directed solely at business combinations and trusts and not labor market restraints. See id. at 492, 493 n.15, 494, 497. Some commentators argue that Congress
intended the Sherman Act to apply only to product market restraints (restraints on the
quantity or price of the final product). See Jerry & Knebel, Antitrust and Employer Re-

straints in Labor Markets, 6

INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS

L.J. 173 (1984).

Restraints on player mobility and freedom of contract are input market restraints because player labor is an input that goes into producing the final product-a sports event.
Therefore, agreements that directly restrict players' ability to market their services may not
be actionable under the antitrust laws. But cf. Scheinholtz & Kettering, Exemption Under
the Antitrust Laws for Joint Employer Activity, 21 DUQ. L. REV. 347 (1983); Altman, Antitrust: A New Tool for Organized Labor? 131 U. PA. L. REV. 127 (1982). Although the players and the decided professional sports cases apparently assume that player restraints fall
within the antitrust laws' ambit, that conclusion is not beyond challenge.
5. Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972), aft'g 443 F.2d 264 (2d Cir. 1971), aff'g 316 F.
Supp. 271 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). The plaintiff, Curtis Flood, was an outstanding center fielder for
the St. Louis Cardinals for 12 years when he was traded to the Philadelphia Phillies in 1969
without being consulted. Flood complained to the Commissioner of Baseball and asked to be
made a free agent. When the Commissioner denied his request, Flood instituted an antitrust
suit in federal court against the Commissioner, the league presidents, and the 24 baseball
clubs. He alleged that the reserve system and other player restraints violated the antitrust
laws and constituted a form of involuntary servitude. Id. at 264-66. The trial court found for
the defendants based on Federal Baseball Club v. National League of Prof. Baseball Clubs,
259 U.S. 200 (1922) and Toolson v. New York Yankees, 346 U.S. 356 (1953).
6. See Wood v. NBA, 809 F.2d 954 (2d Cir. 1987). See also infra notes 153-192 and
accompanying text.
7. See*Baseball Players, Owners Gear Up For New Fight Over Free Agency, Wall St.
J., Oct. 20, 1986 at 29, col. 4; Chass, Steinbrenner Rejects Morris's Proposals,N.Y. Times,
Dec. 20, 1986, at 16, col. 2; Kram, Agents Say Evidence Mounts That Owners Act in Collusion, K.C. Star, Dec. 21, 1986, at 13, col. 1. On September 22, 1987, an arbitrator ruled that
the baseball club owners had conspired to destroy free agency after the 1985 season. See
Lancaster, Baseball Owners Conspired to Shut Down Market for Free Agents, Wall St. J.,
Sept. 22, 1987, at 38, col. 3; Goodwin, Opposing Sides in Dispute Await Remedies, N.Y.
Times, Sept. 22, 1987, at 53, col. 5.
8. Competitive bidding with total free agency should maximize player salaries. When a
player is restricted to bargaining with only one club, the club has greater bargaining power
and can limit player salaries. See Mackey v. NFL, 407 F. Supp. 1000, 1007 (D. Minn. 1975).
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tion,9 however, may herald a new era in player restraint cases. In
Wood, the Second Circuit summarily rejected a player antitrust
challenge to the NBA's college draft and salary cap. The court held
that, as a matter of labor policy, employees can never challenge
collective bargaining agreements on antitrust grounds.
Prior to Wood, the major legal battles concerning player restraints focused on the application of the labor exemptions to antitrust law.1 0 Most courts actually reaching the merits of player restraint cases have rather easily found them violative of the
antitrust laws." Leagues thus have concentrated their labor relations efforts on shielding player restraints from antitrust scrutiny.
There are two distinct but related labor exemptions to the antitrust laws. First, section six of the Clayton Act provides that "[tlhe
labor of a human being is not a commodity or an article of commerce." 1 2 As interpreted by the Supreme Court, this statutory exemption protects union organization and union conduct in furtherance of legitimate labor goals.' 3 Using this exemption, the leagues
could argue that player services are not within the scope of the
antitrust laws because such services are not a commodity or article
of commerce.
The Supreme Court also has devised a judicially created nonstatutory labor exemption from the antitrust laws. 14 The nonstatu9. 809 F.2d 954 (2d Cir. 1987).
10. See supra note 3.
11. See, e.g., Robertson v. NBA, 389 F. Supp. 867, 893 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Kapp v. NFL,
390 F. Supp. 73, 82 (N.D. Cal. 1974); Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 738, 744-45
(D.D.C. 1976).
12. 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1982). See also Clayton Act § 20, 29 U.S.C. § 52 (1982). Congress
also has created a statutory labor exemption to protect certain union activity from antitrust
scrutiny. See Clayton Act § 6, 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1982) ("the labor of a human being is not a
commodity or article of commerce"). See also Clayton Act § 20, 29 U.S.C. § 52 (1982) (limits
the granting of injunctions against union activity); Norris-LaGuardia Act §§ 4, 5, 13; 29
U.S.C. § 104, 105, 113 (1982) (exempting specific union activities from the antitrust laws and
declaring that labor unions are not combinations or conspiracies in restraint of trade). There
is uncertainty, however, as to whether the statutory exemption protects only unilateral
union activity or bilateral agreements between unions and employers. The words of the statute seem directed only at unilateral union behavior although at least one commentator argues that the statutory exemption could protect anticompetitive terms in a collective bargaining agreement. For a discussion of the statutory exemption, see Roberts, infra note 17.
Because the statutory exemption issue is rarely raised in professional sports litigation (probably with good reason), this article will devote little discussion to it.
13. See infra notes 24-43 and accompanying text.
14. The Supreme Court established the nonstatutory labor exemption in Local Union
No. 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676
(1965) and United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965). See generally Meltzer,
Labor Unions, Collective Bargaining, and the Antitrust Laws, 32 U. Cm. L. REy. 659
(1965); Cox, Labor and the Antitrust Laws: Pennington and Jewel Tea, 46 B.U.L. REV. 317
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tory exemption is an attempt by the Court to harmonize labor policy favoring collective bargaining with antitrust policy condemning
anticompetitive agreements. 5 As a result, the nonstatutory exemption focuses not on union organization or unilateral conduct, but
on the collective bargaining process. It serves to protect certain
collective bargaining agreements from antitrust attack.
One or both of the two labor exemptions have been the focal
point of almost every player restraint case of the past two decades.
The nonstatutory exemption has often been the key point of contention. It has been important because, by the early 1970s, almost
all player restraints were embodied in collective bargaining agreements between the players' unions and the leagues. Consequently,
the leagues have repeatedly sought resort to the nonstatutory exemption's protection, largely ignoring the statutory exemption.
The two labor exemptions frequently have been applied in
confusing and inconsistent ways. Some courts have hopelessly confused the two exemptions, failing to explain clearly what they were
considering or to justify adequately their conclusions.1 6 These difficulties are in part the result of a lack of Supreme Court guidance
on the nonstatutory exemption's scope and application. In fact,
some commentators argue that the nonstatutory exemption's development in the professional sports context has been less than
17
appropriate.
Applying the nonstatutory exemption to player restraint cases
raises two primary questions. First, is the exemption appropriate
for dealing with employee antitrust challenges to collective bargaining agreements? The Supreme Court cases creating and considering the exemption all involved employer or product market
competitor challenges to union activity in the bargaining context.1"
The Wood court is the first to suggest that the nonstatutory exemption is not applicable to player challenges. 9 Second, if the
nonstatutory exemption is appropriate, by what standards should a
(1966); Handler, Labor and Antitrust: A Bit of History, 40 ANTITRUST L.J. 233 (1971); St.
Antoine, Connell: Antitrust Law at the Expense of Labor Law, 62 VA. L. REV. 603 (1976);
Jacobs & Winter, Antitrust Principles and Collective Bargaining by Athletes: Of Superstars in Peonage, 81 YALE L.J. 1 (1971).
15. See infra notes 44-90 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 91-97, 103-05 and accompanying text.
17. See J. WEISTART & C. LOWELL, supra note 1, at 581-82, 584-88; Roberts, Sports
League Restraints on the Labor Market: The Failure of Stare Decisis, 47 U. PITT. L. REV.
337, 403-05 (1986).
18. See infra notes 227, 229 and accompanying text.
19. See Wood v. NBA, 809 F.2d 954 (2d Cir. 1987). See also infra notes 152-92 and
accompanying text.
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court evaluate it? The Supreme Court splintered into three groups
of three justices in creating the exemption. That fragmentation,
coupled with the Court's subsequent silence on the subject,2 0 has
left the lower courts largely to their own devices.
The underlying problem in answering both questions in player
restraint cases is how to reconcile notions of fairness with the promotion of collective bargaining. Judicial deference to the collective
bargaining process may allow leagues with relatively greater bargaining power to unilaterally impose restraints on players' unions.
Judicial intervention may wreak havoc on the bargaining process
in contravention of Congressional labor policy. The courts manifested a willingness to intervene in the early sports cases.2 1 Later
cases, however, demonstrate a marked reluctance to interfere in
the bargaining process.22 This trend appears to culminate in the
recent Wood decision.
Because the nonstatutory exemption has been the most commonly litigated of the two, this article undertakes a comprehensive
treatment of the nonstatutory exemption's development in player
restraint cases. First, it examines the nonstatutory exemption's origins, including attempts to point out the distinctions between the
nonstatutory and statutory exemptions. The article will then survey the player restraint cases up to and including Wood v. NBA. 2 3
Following that survey, the article will endeavor to evaluate the
nonstatutory exemption's development and demonstrate the weaknesses of the exemption as developed in the player restraint cases.
The author concludes that the Wood decision is consistent
20. The only other time the Court has considered the nonstatutory exemption was in
Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local Union No. 100, 421 U.S. 616 (1975).
The Court did very little to clarify the nonstatutory exemption in Connell. See infra notes
79-90 and accompanying text.
21. See, e.g., Robertson v. NBA, 389 F. Supp. 867 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Mackey v. NFL,
543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976).
22. In fact, all sports cases since Mackey have demonstrated a reluctance to inquire
into the adequacy of the bargaining process. McCourt v. California Sports, Inc., 600 F.2d
1193, Wood v. NBA, 602 F. Supp. 525, and Zimmerman v. NFL, 632 F. Supp. 398, have all
applied the nonstatutory exemption, finding that bona fide bargaining had occurred. See
600 F.2d at 1198-1203; 602 F. Supp. at 528; 632 F. Supp. at 406-08. The Wood court summarily found bona fide bargaining while the McCourt and Zimmerman courts discussed the
issue more fully; however, their doing so does not imply that they agreed with the requirement. McCourt was decided on the heels of Mackey; therefore, the court may have found it
necessary to carefully distinguish the case from Mackey. Because Zimmerman, like Mackey,
involved the NFL and its players, the Zimmerman court also had a motive for making a
detailed distinction between the case before it and Mackey. There should be a strong presumption that any formal collective bargaining agreement was reached as a result of bona
fide bargaining. The courts in these three cases properly deferred to the bargaining process.
23. 809 F.2d 954 (2d Cir. 1987).
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with the nonstatutory exemption's purpose and probably achieves
the appropriate result. It merely simplifies the inquiry. As an alternative, the article proposes a test for the nonstatutory exemption's
application which is appropriate for all professional sports antitrust cases.

II.

THE NONSTATUTORY LABOR EXEMPTION

A.

Origin

The nonstatutory labor exemption's origins can be traced to
the early statutory exemption cases. These cases made it clear that
the statutory exemption was designed to protect union conduct
taken in pursuance of valid union goals. The Supreme Court, however, did not make it clear whether the statutory exemption's protection extended to collective bargaining agreements. Consequently, although strikes and boycotts were protected from
antitrust attack, the status of collective bargaining agreements was
uncertain.
The nonstatutory labor exemption was born from the Supreme
Court's efforts to interpret the statutory exemption and promote
the Congressionally mandated collective bargaining process. The
early statutory exemption cases, therefore, provide the logical
starting point for an examination of the nonstatutory exemption's
development. The nonstatutory labor exemption cannot be fully
comprehended without an understanding of the statutory exemption's limitations.
The first important statutory exemption case for purposes of
this discussion was Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader.24 In Apex, the Supreme Court reversed an award of antitrust damages to a company
whose unionized employees had gone on strike. The employer had
sued the union, contending that the strike's anticompetitive effect
on the product market violated the antitrust laws.
In reversing the verdict, the Supreme Court did not deny the
strike's anticompetitive effect but, instead, found that the union's
sole purpose had been organization, a legitimate goal.2 5 The court
emphasized that the union's actions were necessary for effective organization. 26 It concluded that strikes conducted solely for unioni24. 310 U.S. 469 (1940).
25. Id. at 501.
26. The court's conclusion is interesting because the only reasonable way to harmonize
union strikes with the Sherman Act's prohibitions is to assert that the antitrust laws were
not directed at labor market restraints. Language throughout Apex Hosiery implies that the
antitrust statutes are directed solely at business combinations and trusts and not labor mar-
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zation purposes were compatible with the Sherman Act. 7 Although
the Apex decision was an interpretation of the Clayton Act's statutory labor exemption, it foreshadowed broader judicial deference to
labor relations. Apex gave the first hint that the Supreme Court
might provide unions with an effective shield against the Sherman
Act. No longer would the antitrust laws exist as an unchecked
threat in an employer's hands.
The following year, in United States v. Hutcheson,2 8 the Supreme Court again addressed union status under the antitrust
laws. The four defendants in Hutcheson, leaders of a carpenters
union, were charged with criminal combination and conspiracy in
violation of the Sherman Act. They organized and participated in a
secondary boycott.29 The district court sustained the defendants
demurrers to the charges 0 and the Supreme Court affirmed. 1
The outcome of the case depended on the relationship between the newly passed Norris-LaGuardia Act 2 and the anti-injunction provision of the Clayton Act. 3 Courts had previously interpreted the anti-injunction provision narrowly, leaving much
union activity subject to injunction on antitrust grounds. The
Court set out to determine whether Congress intended the NorrisLaGuardia Act to amend the Clayton Act. After extensively reviewing the Norris-LaGuardia Act's legislative history, Justice
Frankfurter concluded that the anti-injunction provision in section
ket restraints. See id. at 492, 493 n.15, 494, 497. See also supra note 4.
27. Id.
28. 312 U.S. 219 (1941).
29. Id. at 227-28. Anheuser-Busch, Inc. had agreements with a machinists union and a
carpenters union to erect and dismantle machinery at its breweries. As a result of a dispute
between the two unions concerning which one would perform particular work, the defendants, leaders of the carpenters union, called a strike against Anheuser-Busch and requested
that union members and their friends refrain from purchasing Anheuser-Busch beer. The
defendants were convicted for criminal antitrust violations. The case went directly to the
Supreme Court under the Criminal Appeals Act, 18 U.S.C. § 682.
30. United States v. Hutcheson, 32 F. Supp. 600 (E.D. Mo. 1940).
31. 312 U.S. at 237.
32. 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-10, 113-15 (1982). Section 1 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29
U.S.C. § 101 (1982), denies federal courts jurisdiction "to issue any restraining order or
temporary or permanent injunction in a case involving or growing out of a labor dispute,
except in strict conformity with the provisions of this Act [citations omitted]; nor shall any
such restraining order or temporary or permanent injunction be issued contrary to the public policy declared in this Act [citations omitted]." The Norris-LaGuardia Act was designed
to restrict courts' ability to interfere with union activities, particularly in granting injunctions to employers against union practices. Congress passed the act at a time when courts
had been limiting union activity by reading the Clayton Act narrowly. Whether Congress
actually intended the Norris-LaGuardia Act to amend the Clayton Act is unclear. See
Hutcheson, 312 U.S. at 231-36.
33. 29 U.S.C. § 52 (1982).
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20 of the Clayton Act 8 4 protected the union leaders' actions from
3
prosecution under the Sherman Act. 5
Justice Frankfurter construed section 20 of the Clayton Act in
36
light of the Norris-LaGuardia Act's definition of labor dispute.
He articulated the labor exemption as follows:
So long as a union acts in its self-interest and does not combine
with nonlabor groups, the licit and illicit under section 20 [of
the Clayton Act] are not to be distinguished by any judgment
regarding the wisdom or unwisdom, the rightness or wrongness,
[or] the selfishness or unselfishness of the end of which the particular union activities are the means."
Justice Frankfurter emphasized that the focus should be on the
union's objective rather than on its conduct.3 8
Hutcheson provided protection for many union activities that
were anticompetitive. Unions were protected from the antitrust
laws unless they combined with nonlabor groups to influence the
product market or acted beyond the scope of their own interests.
Although Hutcheson, like Apex, interpreted the statutory labor exemption, it nevertheless revealed the Supreme Court's willingness
to broaden organized labor's antitrust exemption.
The Court next considered organized labor's antitrust status
in Allen Bradley Co. v. Local 3, IBEW 9 In Allen Bradley, the
Court held that an agreement between a New York City electrical
workers union, New York City electrical contractors, and New
York electrical equipment manufacturers violated the Sherman
Act.40 The agreement constituted an antitrust violation because it
attempted to monopolize the market for electrical work in New
York City.41 The Court refused to exempt the union from antitrust
liability and held that labor unions violate the Sherman Act when
they "aid nonlabor groups to create business monopolies and to
control the marketing of goods and services."4
The Court reasoned that "[olur holding means that the same
34. 'Id.
35. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. at 233.
36. 29 U.S.C. § 113(c) (1982).
37. 312 U.S. at 232.
38. Id. Cf. Apex Hosiery v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 501 (1940) (when union's purpose is
not to restrain trade or suppress competition, union actions are not violations of the Sherman Act).
39. 325 U.S. 797 (1945).
40. Id. at 808.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 809.
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labor union activities may or may not be in violation of the Sherman Act, dependent upon whether the union acts alone or in combination with business groups.""' Allen Bradley emphasized the
consequences of union combination with nonlabor groups. Although Allen Bradley was a statutory exemption case, it established the outer limits to which any labor exemption would be
extended.
B.

Modern Development

For the next twenty years, the Supreme Court was silent on
the labor exemption issue. Then, in 1965, the Court decided two
companion cases"" involving the antitrust status of labor unions. In
doing so, the Court created the nonstatutory labor exemption.
In the first case, United Mine Workers v. Pennington,45 a
small coal company brought an action against the United Mine
Workers union, alleging that the union had collectively bargained
with several large coal companies for wages too high for small companies to pay."4 The company asserted that the agreement constituted a conspiracy to drive small competitors out of the coal industry. A jury returned a verdict for the company and the Court. of
Appeals affirmed.4 7
In the second case, Local Union No. 189 v. Jewel Tea Co.,-" a
butchers' union negotiated a collective bargaining agreement with
a multi-employer bargaining unit. The agreement limited the
hours during which an employer store could sell meat.49 An employer who was not a member of the original bargaining group was
later forced into the same agreement. It challenged the sales restraint as an antitrust violation.5
The trial court dismissed the complaint. It held that the statutory labor exemption applied because the union had acted in its
own self-interest."' The Court of Appeals reversed, finding that
43. Id. at 810.
44. Once again, the author wishes to emphasize that Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310
U.S. 469 (1940), United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219 (1941), and Allen Bradley Co. v.
Local Union No. 3, IBEW, 325 U.S. 797 (1945) were all statutory labor exemption (§§ 6 and
20 of the Clayton Act) cases. They did, however, lay the groundwork for the nonstatutory
labor exemption.
45. 381 U.S. 657 (1965).
46. Id. at 659-60.
47. 325 F.2d 804 (6th Cir. 1963).
48. 381 U.S. 676 (1965).
49. Id. at 680.
50. Id. at 680-81.
51. Jewel Tea Co. v. Local Union No. 189, 215 F. Supp. 839 (N.D. Ill. 1963).
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"any agreement by a labor union, acting in concert with business
competitors of the employer, designed to interfere with hisoperation of a retail business . . . is a violation of the Sherman
Act .

"..."52

The Supreme Court reversed both cases. Justice White, writing for a three justice plurality in both cases, discussed the fundamental conflict between national labor policy and the antitrust
laws. 53 He reasoned that because national labor policy seeks to encourage collective bargaining by limiting judicial interference in
the bargaining process, it often fosters anticompetitive agreements. " ' This creates a conflict with the antitrust laws which attempt to limit anticompetitive agreements.5 5 In an effort to reconcile the two policies, the court went beyond the bounds of the
statutory exemption and created a nonstatutory labor exemption
from the antitrust laws. 6
Justice White's opinion can be read to outline the following
three part test for the exemption: 57 (1) Does the labor agreement
concern a "mandatory subject" of bargaining?5" (2) Is the challenged term reasonable (i.e. does the restraint primarily create anticompetitive product market effects)?5 9 (3) Is the agreement or
term a result of the collective bargaining process?60 If all three
questions are answered in the affirmative, the nonstatutory exemption will protect a labor agreement from antitrust challenge.
In applying this test to the Pennington case, Justice White
noted that the UMW's agreement concerned wages, a mandatory
subject, and was part of a collective bargaining agreement. 6 1 He
52.
53.
between
that the
54.

Jewel Tea Co. v. Local Union No. 189, 331 F.2d 547, 549 (7th Cir. 1964).
See 381 U.S. 657, 668; 381 U.S. 676, 689. Justice White's recognition of a conflict
labor and antitrust policies may indicate rejection of Apex Hosiery's suggestion
antitrust laws do not reach labor market restraints. See supra note 4.
381 U.S. at 668, 689.

55. Id.
56. See 381 U.S. at 689-97.
57. Weistart argues that Jewel Tea created a balancing test for the nonstatutory exemption. According to his interpretation, a court must weigh the degree of restraint on the
business market against the type of employee interest at stake. See J.WEISTART & C. LowELL, supra note 1, at 536 n.370. That interpretation is actually similar to the interpretation
adopted by this article. The three part test is merely a more focused inquiry for achieving
the same results.
58. 381 U.S. at 664, 689-90, 692. Section 8(d) of the National Labor Relations Act
makes it a mutual obligation of the employer and the union to bargain collectively "with
respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment." 29 U.S.C. § 158(d)
(1982).
59. 381 U.S. at 665-66, 692.
60. Id. at 664, 689.
61. Id. at 668.
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found that the agreement failed the test's reasonableness requirement because the union was not acting in its own self-interest. 2
Instead, it was helping employers achieve an anticompetitive purpose in the product market. 3 Justice White concluded that even
an employer-union agreement on a mandatory subject could not be
exempt from antitrust challenges if it functioned solely to drive
competitors out of the industry." He then reversed the jury verdict on other grounds0 5 and remanded the case.
In Jewel Tea, Justice White held that the agreement restricting marketing hours fell under the exemption's protection."6 He
first determined that the agreement resulted from bona fide collective bargaining.6 7 Next, he concluded that the restriction was so
intimately related to butchers' working hours and conditions as to
constitute a mandatory bargaining subject.6 8 Relying on the trial
court's findings that the restrictions were reasonable, Justice
White decided that the nonstatutory exemption applied and reversed the Court of Appeals' decision. 9
Justice Goldberg wrote for a three justice concurrence in both
cases. He disagreed with two aspects of the plurality's opinion.
Justice Goldberg doubted the wisdom of having judges determine
70
(1) the reasonableness of collectively bargained-for provisions
and (2) whether an agreement was reached as a result of bona fide
bargaining. 1
Justice Goldberg argued that Congress never intended for
courts to intervene in collective bargaining via the antitrust laws. 2
He feared that allowing judges to determine whether a union acted
unilaterally or in concert with employers would seriously impede
the freedom and effectiveness of collective bargaining.7 3 Therefore,
as a matter of national labor policy, Justice Goldberg urged great
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 664-65.
65. Justice White noted that both the trial court and court of appeals overlooked an
important Supreme Court case, Eastern R.R. PresidentsConf. v. Noerr Motor Freight,Inc.,
365 U.S. 127 (1961), which found that efforts to influence public officials do not violate the
antitrust laws even though intended to eliminate competition. The jury, which was not instructed of this fact, was also improperly instructed on the issue of damages. Id. at 669-72.
66. 381 U.S. at 690.
67. Id. at 689-90, 694-95.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 689-90.
70. Id. at 697, 700, 709-18.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 709, 719.
73. Id. at 716-17.
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deference to the collective bargaining process. Contrary to Justice
White, he concluded that any collective bargaining agreement
which concerns a mandatory subject of bargaining should be ex4
empt from antitrust scrutiny.
Justice Douglas wrote for a three justice concurrence in Pennington. He wrote for the same three in dissent in Jewel Tea. Justice Douglas took the position that any collective bargaining agreement that has an anticompetitive product market effect represents
prima facie evidence of an illegal conspiracy.7 5 He agreed, therefore, that the UMW's agreement in Pennington was not exempt. 76
But he would not have exempted the butchers agreement in Jewel
Tea. 77 Justice Douglas construed Allen Bradley to permit no deference to collective bargaining agreements having a primary an78
ticompetitive impact on the business market.
Jewel Tea and Pennington firmly established the nonstatutory labor exemption. The court's fragmentation on the issue, however, failed to produce a single clear test for the exemption's application. The creation of the nonstatutory exemption shifted the
judicial focus from unilateral union conduct or union objectives to
the collective bargaining process and agreement. The earlier cases'
concern for combination with nonlabor groups, although still present, is less predominant. While the statutory exemption was
designed to promote union organization, the nonstatutory exemption aims (at least implicitly) at encouraging both sides to collectively bargain.
The Supreme Court has addressed the nonstatutory labor exemption only once since Pennington and Jewel Tea. But the Court
declined to enunciate a more specific or particular test for the exemption. In Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local
Union No. 100, 71 the Supreme Court refused to apply the exemption to protect a union's attempts to organize nonunion subcontractors. The defendant union in Connell had selectively picketed
the plaintiff, a general building contractor. It had done so to secure
a contract in which the contractor agreed to subcontract plumbing
and mechanical work only to firms having a current contract with
the union. The contractor had no employees that the union wished
to represent. The contractor signed the contract under protest and
74. Id. at 732, 735.
75. 381 U.S. 672, 673; 381 U.S. 735, 736.
76. See 381 U.S. at 674.
77. See 381 U.S. at 736.
78. See 381 U.S. at 672; 381 U.S. at 735-36.
79. 421 U.S. 616 (1975).
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immediately brought suit claiming that the agreement violated the
Sherman Act. The district court held that the agreement was exempt from attack 80 and the Court of Appeals affirmed."
The Supreme Court refused to apply the nonstatutory labor
exemption's protection to the agreement. It found the nonstatutory exemption inapplicable because the agreement imposed direct
restraints on competition among subcontractors. Such restraints
were not the natural result of the elimination of competition based
on differences in wages and working conditions.82 The Court
pointed out that the nonstatutory exemption arises from the
"strong labor policy favoring the association of employees to eliminate competition over wages and working conditions" 83 but does
not offer protection "when a union and a nonlabor party agree to
restrain competition in the business market."8' 4
The Court concluded that the agreement was outside the collective bargaining relationship because the defendant had no interest in representing the plaintiff's employees. 5 The union's methods were "not immune from antitrust sanctions simply because the
goal [was] legal."86 The Court also noted that "a restraint of this
magnitude might be entitled to an antitrust exemption if it were
8' 7
included in a lawful collective bargaining agreement.
The Connell decision combines inquiries into union objectives
and the collective bargaining process, demonstrating that the Supreme Court dealt with issues beyond the statutory labor exemption. The statutory exemption apparently is limited to an inquiry
into a union's objectives.
In considering the nonstatutory exemption, however, the
Court looked beyond union objectives. It inquired into the challenged agreement's relationship to the collective bargaining process. No matter how legitimate the union's goal, the nonstatutory
labor exemption will not apply if a challenged agreement is not the
result of collective bargaining.
The Supreme Court has interpreted the statutory exemption
primarily as a shield to protect union organization. 8 The nonstatu80. Id.
81. Id. at 625-26.
82. See supra notes 56, 59 & 60.
83. 421 U.S. at 622.
84. Id. at 622-23.
85. Id. at 635.
86. Id. at 625.
87. Id. at 625-26.
88. See, e.g., Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469 (1940); United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219 (1941).

Published by Institutional Repository, 1987

13

University of Miami Entertainment & Sports Law Review, Vol. 4, Iss. 2 [1987], Art. 4

296

ENTERTAINMENT & SPORTS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 4:283

tory exemption, however, apparently is designed to promote collective bargaining after a union has organized. The Court's interpretations of the two exemptions might be viewed as an attempt to
protect different stages of organized labor's evolution.
Early in its history, organized labor needed assistance just to
survive. Congress then passed and the Court interpreted the statutory labor exemption. Once organized labor established itself, the
Court created the nonstatutory exemption to encourage employers
to come to the bargaining table. Both exemptions, however, share
one limitation: the Court will not employ them to sanction agreements having primarily anticompetitive product market consequences.
Although Jewel Tea and Pennington firmly established the
nonstatutory exemption, the Supreme Court has never fully defined its boundaries. The failure of any more than three justices to
approve any particular formulation creates imprecise guidelines.
Nevertheless, six justices in each case did agree on two points.
First, only an agreement concerning mandatory subjects of bargaining could be exempt. 9 Second, to merit exemption, an agreement must be the result of collective bargaining.9 0
In Connell, the Court again focused on whether the challenged
agreement resulted from the collective bargaining process. But it
failed to specify whether a restraint must be embodied in a formal
collective bargaining agreement to be exempt. The Court's conclusion that the challenged agreement in Connell fell outside the bargaining relationship did not require it to clarify two questions
raised by Pennington and Jewel Tea. These questions are: (1) to
what extent should a court inquire into the bargaining process to
determine whether a restraint is reasonable? and (2) to what extent should a court question whether an agreement is the result of
bona fide good faith collective bargaining?
C. Player Restraint Cases
The nonstatutory labor exemption became prominent in professional sports litigation with the development of player unions in
the late 1960s and early 1970s. With the advent of unions, sports
leagues' labor practices became subject to the federal labor laws.
During that time, all the major professional leagues negotiated collective bargaining agreements with their respective players' unions.
89.
90.

See 381 U.S. at 664-66, 689-97.
Id.
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Most, if not all, of the leagues' prior practices were incorporated into these agreements. Young and weak players' unions
lacked the leverage necessary to obtain a relaxation of player restraints. Consequently, dissatisfied players, and on at least one occasion a rival league, began to challenge league rules restricting
player mobility as antitrust violations. Because the alleged practices were no longer simply league rules but elements of collective
bargaining agreements, the leagues and clubs raised the nonstatutory labor exemption as a defense. This forced courts to address
the nonstatutory exemption's applicability to professional sports.
The first major case to address the exemption issue was Philadelphia World Hockey Club, Inc. v. Philadelphia Hockey Club,
Inc.9The newly formed World Hockey Association (WHA) alleged
that the National Hockey League's (NHL) reserve clause, affiliation agreements, and other devices controlling the supply of
hockey players violated the antitrust laws. 2 The court, on a motion for summary judgment and a request for a preliminary injunction, held that the labor exemption was inapplicable and would not
protect the NHL.9 3 The court purportedly based its inquiry on the
statutory exemption, but its references to nonstatutory exemption
cases and its emphasis on collective bargaining belie that assertion.
In order to resolve the labor exemption issue, the court inquired whether the NHL's player restraints were the result of "serious, intensive, arm's length collective bargaining."' It concluded
that they were not. The court noted that the reserve clause had
been imposed on the players prior to the union's existence and,
although the evidence demonstrated that both sides had discussed
the reserve clause, the court found that the parties had never collectively bargained over the restraint.9 5
The court distinguished Hutcheson and Jewel Tea as cases in
which the union played an active role in creating and enforcing the
alleged restraint and extensive collective bargaining had occurred. 6 In the case before it, the court determined that management had unilaterally imposed player restraints in the face of consistent union opposition and that little collective bargaining had
occurred. The court also suggested that because the complaining
party was an economic competitor of the defendant, the NHL's
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

351 F. Supp. 462 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
See id.
Id. at 517-19.
Id. at 499.
Id. at 485.
Id. at 498-99.
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player restraints had the anticompetitive characteristics and effects condemned in Allen Bradley and Pennington." The restraints acted to injure product market competitors of the
defendant.
Philadelphia World Hockey Club's emphasis on the lack of
collective bargaining set the tone for future player restraint cases.
Subsequent cases were brought almost exclusively by players, not
rival leagues. Thus, Philadelphia World Hockey Club's primary
contribution to the nonstatutory labor exemption issue in professional sports was its focus on the existence of actual and extensive
collective bargaining. Even though the court purported to rely on
the statutory exemption, its analysis is more consistent with an examination of the nonstatutory exemption.
The next sports case to consider the labor exemption issue was
Kapp v. NFL.9 8 In Kapp, a veteran quarterback brought suit alleging that the draft, the "Rozelle Rule,""' and mandatory standard
form contracts unreasonably restrained his ability to market his
services. The NFL raised the nonstatutory labor exemption as a
defense. The league asserted that the challenged practices were incorporated, either specifically or by reference, in the league's collective bargaining agreement, making them subject to collective
bargaining. 00 In its view, matters subject to union-employer bargaining should not be open to challenge by disgruntled individual
employees. 10 '
The Kapp court refused to apply the nonstatutory exemption.
It doubted that the restraints were the product of collective bargaining.1 02 The court suggested that even if bargaining had been
present, the exemption would not apply. It decided that public
policy weighed against extending the exemption to immunize direct restraints on an employee's right to freely seek and choose em97. Id.
98. 390 F. Supp. 73 (N.D. Cal. 1974).
99. Under the NFL's reserve system, a player became a free agent at the expiration of
his contractual obligations to one NFL club. However, the Rozelle Rule required any club
that signed a free agent to compensate the player's old team. If the teams could not agree on
compensation, the NFL commissioner would determine the appropriate compensation in
terms of current players or future draft choices. The commissioner's intervention had been
invoked only four times since the rule's adoption in 1963. In each case, the commissioner
awarded substantial compensation. The result deterred clubs from signing free agents. See
Mackey v. NFL, 407 F. Supp. 1000, 1006 (D. Minn. 1975).
100. Kapp v. NFL, 390 F. Supp. at 78-79.
101. Id. The Wood court adopted this point of view in its decision. See infra notes
153-92 and accompanying text.
102. Kapp v. NFL, 390 F. Supp. at 85-86.
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ployment"'0 No other court before or since has applied such a rationale for either labor exemption.
Subsequent cases have not relied on Kapp because the court
provided scant support for its rather perplexing rationale. The
Kapp court's reasoning would invalidate virtually all player restraints regardless of their origin. The Kapp court appears to have
been assessing the reasonableness of the challenged restraints
without any consideration for the bargaining process. It failed to
even attempt to strike a balance between competing antitrust and
federal labor policies. Consequently, Kapp contributes little to
nonstatutory exemption analysis in professional sports.
The year following Kapp, another sports case involving the
nonstatutory labor exemption arose. In Robertson v. NBA, 0 4 a
group of professional basketball players challenged various player
restraints such as the college draft and the league's reserve system.
The league responded by claiming immunity under the statutory
and nonstatutory labor exemptions.
On the league's motion for summary judgment, the court concluded that the labor exemption was intended to protect only unions and was not available to the league.10 5 The court first stated
that the NBA's claimed exemption was to be "found in Sections 6
and 20 of the Clayton Act." ' 6 But the court then proceeded to
discuss the exemption issue by reference to Pennington and Jewel
Tea. This reliance on the Supreme Court's nonstatutory exemption
cases makes it apparent that the court was probably considering
the nonstatutory exemption. The result was that the Robertson
court hopelessly confused the statutory and nonstatutory labor exemptions. This case, therefore, like Kapp, contributed little to labor exemption analysis in professional sports.
The nonstatutory labor exemption's status in professional
sports was clarified considerably in Mackey v. NFL.'0 7 In Mackey,
nine NFL players filed suit alleging that the NFL's reserve system
constituted a concerted refusal to deal in violation of the antitrust
laws. The labor exemption was a major component of the NFL's
defense. After a fifty-five day bench trial, the trial court held that
the Rozelle Rule was a per se antitrust violation and that neither
103. Id. at 86.
104. 389 F. Supp. 867 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
105. Id. at 884-86.
106. Id. at 884.
i07. 407 F. Supp. 1000 (D. Minn. 1975), modified, 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976), cert
dismissed, 434 U.S. 801 (1977).
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the statutory or nonstatutory labor exemption applied. 10 8
The court gave three reasons for rejecting the exemption.
First, like the Robertson court, it concluded that the exemption
extended only to unions, not employers. That conclusion is clearly
incorrect with respect to the nonstatutory exemption because its
purpose is to encourage both sides to collectively bargain. 0 9 Second, the court observed that because the Rozelle Rule was an antitrust violation, it could not be a mandatory bargaining subject." 0
Therefore, it could not be exempt. The court probably was correct
in asserting that only agreements on mandatory subjects could be
exempt. But by determining legality first and exemption second,
the court's standard protects only those practices which need no
protection.
The district court's third reason was legitimate. As in Philadelphia World Hockey Club, the court held that the Rozelle Rule
was not the result of serious collective bargaining. Instead, the
league had unilaterally imposed it on the union."
On appeal, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the trial court's exemption result. The appellate court, however, rejected the trial court's
first two reasons for finding neither labor exemption applicable. 2
The court went on to clearly articulate a three-part test for applying the nonstatutory exemption. The court drew its test from the
Supreme Court's Pennington and Jewel Tea decisions. The test is
as follows: (1) Does the challenged agreement primarily affect only
the parties to the collective bargaining agreement?113 (2) Does the
agreement relate to a mandatory subject of collective bargaining?"" (3) Is the agreement embodied in a formal collective bargaining agreement that is the product of bona fide, arm's-length
bargaining?1 15 If all three questions are answered affirmatively, the
exemption applies.
108. 407 F. Supp. at 1007-10.
109. See Roberts, supra note 17, at 385 n.190 (discussing nonstatutory exemption's
purpose).
110. 407 F. Supp. at 1009-10.
111. Id.
112. See Mackey, 543 F.2d at 615 (rejecting trial court's findings at 407 F. Supp. at
1009-10).
113. The court formulated this requirement from language in Connell, 421 U.S. 616,
Jewel Tea, 381 U.S. 676, and Pennington, 381 U.S. 657. See 543 F.2d at 614.
114. The court drew this aspect of the test from Jewel Tea, 381 U.S. 676, and Pennington, 381 U.S. 657. See 543 F.2d at 614.
115. The Mackey court derived this requirement from Jewel Tea, 381 U.S. 676, and
also referred to several sports cases, including Smith v. Pro Football, 420 F. Supp. 738
(D.D.C. 1976). See 543 F.2d at 614.
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In -applying this test to the facts before it, the court easily
found that the first element was satisfied. It concluded that the
Rozelle Rule affected "only the parties to the agreement sought to
be exempted.""O The court also held that the mandatory subject
requirement was satisfied because the rule had a definite impact
on player mobility and salaries."1 7 But the court held that the NFL
failed to satisfy the exemption test's third point. Relying on the
trial court's findings that there had been no bargaining over the
Rozelle Rule, the Mackey court concluded that the rule had been
unilaterally imposed. The rule, therefore, was undeserving of
protection.1 1 8
Mackey is a landmark decision in professional sports litigation. In every subsequent sports case in which the nonstatutory exemption issue has been raised, courts have applied the Mackey
test. Even outside the sports context, courts have approved the
Mackey formulation. The Wood case is the first sports case in
which a court has refused to specifically apply Mackey. Both the
propriety of the Mackey test and the Wood decision's implications
are discussed in subsequent sections of this article.
The National Football League again attempted to claim the
11 9
protection of the labor exemption in Smith v.Pro Football, Inc.
The district court's decision in Smith was rendered while the
Mackey appeal was pending. The league once again came up short.
The Smith court also refused to apply the exemption. The Smith
court's standards for applying the nonstatutory exemption are almost identical to those articulated in the Mackey appellate court
decision.
In Smith, the plaintiff was a first round draft pick of the
Washington Redskins in the 1968 player draft. Smith's career ended prematurely when he suffered a severe neck injury in the final
game of his rookie season. Smith sued the NFL and the Redskins,
alleging that the college draft resulted in a group boycott which
violated the antitrust laws. He further alleged that had he not been
forced to deal with only one club, he could have negotiated a
higher salary and adequate guarantees against loss of earnings in
the event of injury.1 20 The defendants raised the statutory and
nonstatutory labor exemptions as defenses.
116. Mackey, 543 F.2d at 615.
117. Id. at 615-16.
118. Id. at 616.
119. 420 F. Supp. 738 (D.D.C. 1976), aff'd in part & rev'd in part, 593 F.2d 1173 (D.C.
Cir. 1978).
120. 420 F. Supp. at 740-41.
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The trial court ignored the statutory exemption but specifically rejected the nonstatutory labor exemption defense. The court
rejected the defense because no collective bargaining agreement
existed, nor had ever existed, between the players' union and the
NFL at the time Smith signed his contract. 1 21 The court noted that
the 1968 draft occurred before the players' union even received
certification as the players' exclusive bargaining agent. The court
concluded that not even the potential for bargaining had existed at
the time Smith was drafted. Therefore, the nonstatutory labor ex122
emption could not possibly apply.
Surprisingly, after reaching this conclusion, the court went on
to discuss the potential application of the nonstatutory labor exemption in player cases. The court based its discussion on Pennington, Jewel Tea, Allen Bradley, and Hutcheson.123 It indicated
that four requirements were necessary to exempt a player restraint. First, the restraint must be embodied in a collective bargaining agreement. 24 Second, the restraint must concern a
mandatory subject of bargaining within the meaning of the federal
labor laws.125 Third, the restraint must'be the result of genuine
arm's-length bargaining and not unilateral imposition on the
union. 2 ' Finally, the restraint must not have a direct anticompetitive impact on the employer's product market competitors.
The Smith court's proposed test is, in somewhat restated
form, the Mackey test (or perhaps vice versa). Although the proposed standards in Smith are virtually identical to the Mackey
standards, only Mackey qualifies as binding precedent because the
Smith court's discussion was largely dicta. The NFL's decision not
to appeal the nonstatutory exemption issue prevented the D.C.
Circuit from considering the issue on appeal. 27
The nonstatutory labor exemption issue was soon to reach the
appellate court level again. In 1978, an arbitrator assigned a Detroit Red Wings (NHL) player's contract to the Los Angeles Kings
as compensation for a free agent the Red Wings had signed from
the Kings. This free agent compensation scheme was provided for
in the first collective bargaining agreement between the NHL and
the players' union. In this case, the assigned player refused to re121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.

Id. at 742.
Id. at 741-42.
Id. at 742.
Id.
Id. at 743.
Id.
See 593 F.2d 1173 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
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port to Los Angeles and filed suit. In McCourt v. California
Sports, Inc.,12 Dale McCourt, the assigned player, alleged that the
free agent compensation system violated the Sherman Act because
his contract could be assigned without his or his club's consent.
The trial court rejected the NHL's nonstatutory exemption
defense and granted McCourt a preliminary injunction. The court
followed the Mackey test and reasoned that the compensation
scheme (in effect a reserve system) was not the result of good faith,
arm's-length bargaining. 1 9 The court based its conclusion on several considerations. First, the collective bargaining agreement was
the first between the league and its players. Second, the players'
union was relatively weak when the agreement was reached. Third,
the court decided that the system was unilaterally imposed. Finally, the court perceived no quid pro quo that the union received
for its acquiescence."3 '
On appeal, a divided panel of the Sixth Circuit determined
that the nonstatutory exemption applied and reversed the preliminary injunction.'
The Sixth Circuit, like the district court, also
applied the Mackey test, but disagreed with the district court's application of the bona fide bargaining requirement. The court of appeals pointed to the union's vigorous opposition to the reserve sys13 2
tem prior to capitulating as evidence of bona fide bargaining.
Consequently, the court distinguished the case from Mackey and
applied the exemption.
The Mackey test was firmly established after McCourt. Two
subsequent district court decisions have applied the Mackey test
as a matter of course. Both found the nonstatutory exemption applicable to collectively bargained for player restraints. One of those
cases, Wood v. NBA, "' is discussed in this article's following section. The other decision, Zimmerman v. NFL,3 was decided in
1986.
In Zimmerman, a former United States Football League
player challenged the NFL's "supplemental draft"3 5 of USFL
128. 460 F. Supp. 904 (E.D. Mich. 1978), rev'd, 600 F.2d 1193 (6th Cir. 1979).
129. 460 F. Supp. at 910-11.
130. Id. at 911.
131. 600 F.2d at 1198.
132. Id. at 1203.
133. 602 F. Supp. 525 (S.D.N.Y. 1984), aff'd, 809 F.2d 954 (2d Cir. 1987).
134. 632 F. Supp. 398 (D.D.C. 1986).
135. In response to the USFL's rapid emergence as a viable competitor to the NFL for
college player services, the NFL and the players' union created a "supplemental draft." Its
purpose was to allow NFL teams to draft players already under contract with the USFL
without risking regular draft choices on players they might never sign. If the selected USFL
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players as an antitrust violation. The "supplemental draft" was
provided for in an amendment to the league's collective bargaining
agreement. Zimmerman wished to play in the NFL. After the supplemental draft, Zimmerman was apparently unable to come to
terms with the NFL club that drafted him. He wanted to market
his services as a free agent, but the NFL refused to permit him to
do so. When Zimmerman sued, the NFL raised the nonstatutory
labor exemption as a defense.
In summary fashion, the district court laid out the Mackey
test and found that the mandatory subject requirement was satisfied.'3s The court then briefly discussed the "primary effect" question. It concluded that the supplemental draft primarily affected
the NFL and its players and not any product market competitors.
Interestingly, the court dropped part of the Mackey test's third
requirement. The court departed from Mackey in that it refused to
require that the restraint be embodied in a formal agreement.'3"
Zimmerman asserted that the supplemental draft was void because the union failed to follow proper procedure in the amending
process. 13 8 Rather than address that issue, the court avoided it. It
did so by reading Connell'3 9 as implying that a challenged provision need not be contained in a formal collective bargaining agreement to merit exemption. 40
The court also addressed Zimmerman's assertion that the collective bargaining agreement did not bind him because he was not
a party to it when it was adopted.'" The court easily dismissed
that contention relying on the district court opinion in Wood v.
NBA."' The court concluded that even potential NFL players are
3
bound by the league's collective bargaining agreement.'
Finally, the court examined the question of whether the supplemental draft was the result of bona fide, arm's-length bargaining. Adopting a deferential approach reflective of the McCourt
opinion, the court surveyed the evidence. It determined that the
union received quid pro quo for the supplemental draft as a result
of bona fide bargaining. Zimmerman asserted that the letter agreeplayers wished to enter the NFL, they were permitted to negotiae with only the team that
drafted them. See 632 F. Supp. at 401.
136. 632 F. Supp. at 403-04.
137. Id. at 404.
138. Id.
139. See supra notes 79-87 and accompanying text.
140. 632 F. Supp. at 404-05.
141. Id. at 405.
142. 602 F. Supp. 525 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
143. 632 F. Supp. at 405-06.
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ment in which the union agreed to the draft reflected no quid pro
quo 4 and the NFL's concessions in exchange for the draft were
meaningless. " ' In response to Zimmerman's first contention, the
court observed, both in the text of its opinion " " and in a footnote, 4 that evidence of quid pro quo need not be contained in the
agreement under consideration. It reasoned that other agreements
outside the written record could constitute quid pro quo.
The court then proceeded to overcome both of Zimmerman's
arguments. Zimmerman contended that because the owners had already decided upon a 49-man roster, their promise to that effect in
exchange for the draft provision meant nothing. The court, however, rejected that argument. It pointed to evidence that the union
valued, and actively sought, the guarantee.148 The court noted that
the owners also agreed to resume providing player contracts (apparently the owners had refused to for some time), under Article
XII of the 1982 collective bargaining agreement.14 9 The court
deemed that concession important even though the owners already
had an obligation to provide the contracts. In the eyes of the court,
the concession had value because it avoided the costly delay of a
union grievance proceeding.1"' In short, the court deferred to "the
1 1 in deterrelative bargaining prowess and strategy of the parties""
mining if quid pro quo was exchanged. Thus, the court held that
the supplemental draft agreement satisfied all aspects of the
Mackey test. Consequently, it applied the nonstatutory labor exemption to shield the agreement.
McCourt, Zimmerman, and (as will be seen) Wood all appear
to indicate a trend in player restraint cases. As player unions have
become stronger and more established, the courts have moved toward greater deference to the collective bargaining process. Although the early cases used the lack of bona fide bargaining to
deny the exemption's protection, more recent decisions indicate an
increasing reluctance to interfere. " 2 The Second Circuit's recent
144. Id. at 407.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. n.9.
148. Id. at 408.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. At least one commentator has argued that preliminary rulings in the pending
NBA and NFL cases indicate a new judicial willingness to intervene in the collective bargaining process. See Roberts, Courts End Run the Law in NBA, NFL Cases, Wall St. J.,
Feb. 25, 1988, at 20, col. 3.
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decision in Wood is the epitome of non-interference.
D.

1 53
Wood v. National Basketball Association

On September 13, 1984, 0. Leon Wood, a talented point guard
and member of the 1984 gold medal-winning United States
Olympic basketball team, filed an antitrust suit in federal district
court in New York. 154 Wood challenged several provisions of the
National Basketball Association's (NBA) collective bargaining
agreement with the National Basketball Players Association
(NBPA). Wood alleged that the salary cap, college draft, and ban
on player corporations violated the Sherman Act. He also contended that the nonstatutory labor exemption did not protect the
collective bargaining agreement.
The challenged provisions were in part the result of an earlier
antitrust dispute between players and the NBA. In Robertson v.
NBA, 55 the NBA players challenged both the NBA's merger with
the American Basketball Association and certain NBA employment practices such as the college draft. After extensive pretrial
proceedings, 56 the parties settled on April 29, 1976. The Settlement Agreement provided for substantial modifications of the
NBA's employment practices.
The Settlement Agreement was effective through the 1986-87
season. 1 7 It modified the college draft system by limiting the
teams' exclusive right to sign a player to only one year. If a team
fails to sign a draft choice, he may re-enter the draft the following
year. The Settlement Agreement also created a system of free
agency that permits veterans to sell their services to the highest
bidder. The free agency scheme is limited only in that it allows a
player's current team the right of first refusal by matching his best
offer.
In 1980, the NBA and NBPA signed a collective bargaining
agreement that incorporated the Settlement Agreement provisions.
The agreement expired in 1982 and a new collective- bargaining
agreement was reached, in principle, in the spring of 1983. The
153. 602 F. Supp. 525 (S.D.N.Y. 1984), aff'd, 809 F.2d 954 (2d Cir. 1987).
154. The facts of this case are detailed in 809 F.2d at 956-57.
155. 389 F. Supp. 867 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
156. See id.
157. The collective bargaining agreement expired in June 1987 and a new one has not
yet been negotiated. The players have filed an antitrust suit, and the league has countered
with an unfair labor practice claim. The players have even temporarily decertified their
union and all become free agents in an attempt to avoid application of the exemption. See
Goldpaper, supra note 2; Roberts, supra note 152.
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new agreement was memorialized in a Memorandum of
Understanding.
The Memorandum continued the college draft and free agency
provisions. It also established a minimum for player salaries and a
maximum for aggregate team salaries. The latter provision is
known as the "salary cap." Under the salary cap, a team that has
reached its maximum permissible team salary may sign first-round
draft choices like Wood to only a one-year, $75,000 contract.
The Memorandum also prohibited the "player corporations"
which some players had been forming to enter into contracts. The
league wanted to eliminate administrative and accounting difficulties and potential tax liability. Changes in the tax laws had also
apparently made this device less attractive to the players. Because
the Memorandum altered portions of the Settlement Agreement
the NBA and the NBPA requested district court approval of the
modifications. The court approved the modifications on June 13,
1983.
Against this backdrop, the Philadelphia 76ers drafted Wood in
the 1984 college draft's first round. At the time, the 76ers team
payroll exceeded the salary cap. Therefore, they could only offer
Wood a one year contract for $75,000. That offer was necessary for
Philadelphia to retain exclusive rights to Wood. In fact, Philadelphia intended to adjust its roster so it could later sign Wood for
substantially more money. Wood, however, refused to sign the oneyear contract.
In September of 1984, Wood filed suit against the NBA. He
sought a preliminary injunction against enforcement of the college
draft, salary cap, and ban on player corporations. The district
court, per Judge Carter, 6 8 denied Wood's motion. Judge Carter
applied the Mackey'5 9 test for the nonstatutory labor exemption to
the college draft and the salary cap. He found that both "affect
only the parties to the collective bargaining agreement - the NBA
and the players - involve mandatory subjects of bargaining as defined by federal labor laws, and are the result of bona fide arm'slength negotiations.' 0 Judge Carter held that "these provisions
come under the protective shield of our national 6labor policy and
are exempt from the reach of the Sherman Act."'"
158. Judge Carter retained jurisdiction over cases involving the NBA and its players
after deciding Robertson, 389 F. Supp. 867, in 1975.
159. See supra notes 113-15.
160. 602 F. Supp. at 528.
161. Id.
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Judge Carter also rejected Wood's claim concerning the ban
on player corporations. He noted that the provision was probably a
mandatory bargaining subject but, even if it were not, it implicated
no antitrust concerns. 162 Finally, Judge Carter dismissed Wood's
contention that the draft failed Mackey's first requirement because its primary effect was to restrict the options of future players. 1 3 Judge Carter implicitly read Mackey's primary effect requirement to focus on a team's or league's competitors, not on
future players.164 He concluded that a contrary conclusion would
destroy all leagues' draft systems and "turn federal labor policy on
its head."'"
Meanwhile, Wood signed a four-year contract with the 76ers
for $1.02 million. He was later traded. In January 1986, the parties
submitted evidence to Judge Carter for a decision on the merits.
On February 5, 1986, Judge Carter granted judgment for the NBA
and Wood appealed.'
On appeal, the Second Circuit, in an opinion by Judge Winter,6 7 flatly rejected Wood's claims. The court first assumed that
the college draft and salary cap would be antitrust violations in the
absence of a collective bargaining agreement.' It then noted the
strength of federal labor policy when collective bargaining is involved. 69 The court surprisingly refused to "debate or probe the
exact contours of the so-called statutory or nonstatutory 'labor exemptions,' because "no one seriously contends that the antitrust
laws may be used to subvert fundamental principles of our federal
labor policy ....
The Second Circuit viewed Wood's claims as a "wholesale sub162. Id. at 529.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Why Wood appealed is an intriguing question. McCourt v. California Sports, Inc.,
600 F.2d 1193 (6th Cir. 1979), and Judge Carter's decision in Robertson offered little hope of
penetrating the nonstatutory exemption's shield. Even Mackey, 543 F.2d 606, offered little
support. The Mackey court's reliance on the lack of bargaining due to the players' relatively
weak bargaining power probably is not a valid concern a decade later. One commentator
suggests that the players in the current NBA and NFL suits may be counting on judicial
sympathy and intervention. See Roberts, supra note 152.
167. While a Yale Law School professor in 1971, Judge Winter proposed the Wood
result as the proper solution in player restraint cases. See Jacobs & Winter, Antitrust Principles and Collective Bargaining by Athletes: Of Superstars in Peonage, 81 YALE L.J. 1
(1971). Judge Winter acknowledged his previous treatment of the subject in a footnote at
the beginning of the Wood opinion. See 809 F.2d 954, 958 n.1.
168. 809 F.2d at 959.
169. Id.
170. Id.
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version" of federal labor policy and rejected them "out of hand."'
The court observed that although the sports industries are unique,
they are still subject to the same federal labor policies as other
industries. 17 1 It discussed the rationale for collective bargaining
and recognized that it might actually be detrimental to particular,
highly skilled employees. But the court reasoned that allowing
such employees to challenge a completed collective bargaining
agreement would undermine the entire collective bargaining process.' 7 3 The court dismissed the high public visibility of profes174
sional sports as a reason for ignoring federal labor legislation.
The Second Circuit pointed out that other industries "routinely set standard wages for employees with differing responsibilities, skills, and levels of efficiency" through collective bargaining.7 8
Observing that other industries' collective agreements often provide for the "exclusive referral of workers ...to particular employers, '"1' the court concluded that the college draft was "functionally
indistinguishable.' 7 6 Addressing Wood's contention that new players were unfairly restricted, the court replied that collective agreements commonly include seniority provisions. 77 Judge Winter
pointed out that collective agreements almost always affect employees outside the bargaining unit.17 8 If Wood's claim were to succeed, he concluded, "federal labor policy would essentially
79
collapse."
Judge Winter also cautioned against judicial meddling in the
bargaining process. He stated that "courts cannot hope to fashion
contract terms more efficient than those arrived at by the parties
.... ""ISecond, he warned that "[tlo the extent that courts prohibit particular solutions for particular problems, they reduce the
number and quality of compromises available to unions and employers for resolving their differences.' 8 2 Judge Winter noted that
the professional sports industry, in particular, may reach "seem171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 960.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 961.
181. Id.
182. Id.
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ingly unfamiliar or strange agreements"1 83 with which courts
should not interfere.
Finally, the court determined that the ban on player corporations was also a mandatory bargaining subject and immune from
attack." The court did so because player corporations affect
player wages and team costs and are a bona fide subject of collective bargaining.' 8 5 The court speculated that if Wood was to have
any claim based on discrimination against new players, he would
have to rely on a breach of the duty of fair representation by the
union rather than on antitrust grounds." 5
The court concluded its opinion by distinguishing the Supreme Court's nonstatutory exemption cases from Wood's claims.
It viewed the Supreme Court decisions as involving injuries to employers in the product market.' 87 The court dismissed any considerations of "fine distinctions going to whether product or labormarket activities are in issue.' 8 8 It rejected Wood's claims simply
because they would subvert federal labor policy. 89
The Wood court may have written the final chapter on player
restraint cases, at least when challenges are based on antitrust
grounds. 19 0 Whether the court would permit challenges on grounds
other than the union's duty of fair representation is an open and
intriguing question. In effect, the Wood decision holds that no employee can challenge, on antitrust grounds, any provision in a collective bargaining agreement that his union has negotiated. The
Wood court's decision focuses on who is challenging the collective
bargaining agreement. This approach is full circle from the early
sports' cases focus on the bargaining process.
Whether the Wood decision is inconsistent with the Supreme
Court's nonstatutory exemption cases is another question. Perhaps
the Wood court is simply trying to discourage player antitrust suits
against the leagues. Because player unions are no longer so weak, 19'
183. Id.
184. Id. at 962.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 963.
188. Id.
189. Id. The court noted that virtually all other courts addressing player restraint issues had reached a similar conclusion but on different grounds. See 809 F.2d at 962 n.6
(citing McCourt v. California Sports, Inc., 600 F.2d 1193, 1197-98 (6th Cir. 1979); Mackey v.
NFL, 543 F.2d 606, 614 (8th Cir. 1976); and Zimmerman v. NFL, 632 F. Supp. 398, 403-04
(D.D.C. 1986)).
190. Recent developments may undercut this conclusion. See supra notes 2, 150.
191. Cf. Comment, A Player's View of the NFL Reserve System, 4 ENT. & SP. L.J. 129
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extensive collective bargaining does occur. Consequently, Wood
could be read as a recognition that players no longer need judicial
protection. Such a reading is probably an oversimplification, however. Judge Winter has announced a legal theory that, as a matter
of federal labor policy, employees (in any industry) cannot challenge collective bargaining agreements on antitrust grounds.' 9 2
This article's next section will evaluate the nonstatutory exemption's role in professional sports. This evaluation will include an
exploration of the implications of the Wood decision. Finally, the
author will propose a nonstatutory labor exemption test appropriate for sports cases.

III.

LEGAL ANALYSIS OF THE NONSTATUTORY LABOR EXEMPTION

A.

Parties Protected

An initial question in analyzing the nonstatutory labor exemption is whether it protects only unions, or both unions and employers. The Supreme Court has never addressed this issue. The nonstatutory exemption cases it has decided have all involved
employer or third party challenges to union activity. 9 3
In typical professional sports cases, an individual player usually challenges an employer practice. 94 Some lower courts have
held that the nonstatutory labor exemption protects only unions.
They have done so by drawing an analogy between the statutory
(1987).
192. Judge Winter sees the issue as a broad question of labor policy. Wood's holding
does not appear limited to player restraint cases. Judge Winter first proposed the solution
announced in Wood over 16 years ago. See Jacobs & Winter, supra note 164.
193. See, e.g., Allen Bradley v. Local Union No. 3, IBEW, 325 U.S. 797 (1945) (business market competitors sued union); UMW v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965) (competing
employer sued union); Local Union No. 189 v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676 (1965) (competing employer sued union); Connell Constr. Co v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local Union No.
100, 421 U.S. 616 (1975) (employer sued union). In his Jewel Tea concurrence, however,
Justice Goldberg concluded that "unions and employers are exempt from the operations of
the antitrust laws for activities involving subjects of mandatory bargaining .... 381 U.S. at
735 (emphasis supplied). In Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972), a player challenged labor
market restraints but the Supreme Court never reached the nonstatutory exemption question. The Court simply refused to remove baseball's general antitrust exemption in light of
Congressional acquiescence. 407 U.S. at 294.
194. See, e.g., Mackey v. NFL, 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. dismissed, 434 U.S.
801 (1977) (challenge to NFL's "Rozelle Rule (free agent system); McCourt, 600 F.2d 1193
(challenge to hockey's free agent compensation system; Wood v. NBA, 602 F. Supp. 525
(S.D.N.Y. 1984) (challenges to the player draft, team salary cap, and the ban on player
corporations); Zimmerman v. NFL, 632 F. Supp. 398 (D.D.C. 1986) (challenge to the NFL's
supplemental draft of USFL players).
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and nonstatutory exemptions.19 5 The statutory exemption, with its
focus on union organization, arguably is intended to protect only
unions. 19e But as noted previously, the statutory and nonstatutory
exemptions are different. They apparently serve distinct, although
related, aspects of national labor policy.
Most courts properly assume that the nonstatutory labor exemption is available to both employers and unions.1 97 Because the
nonstatutory exemption issue commonly arises when employers
sue unions, courts have rarely been required to address the problem. Most courts that have addressed the issue have extended protection to employers. 198
The exemption would not serve its purpose of promoting collective bargaining if it was only available to unions. Such a result
would leave employers at risk for entering into collective bargaining agreements. 9 9 The nonstatutory labor exemption is designed to
encourage both sides to engage in the bargaining process. It can do
so effectively only if it protects both parties.
The Wood decision's holding that employees cannot challenge
collective bargaining agreements on antitrust grounds reverses the
issue. Instead of determining who is protected, the court focuses on
who may challenge an agreement. The court's conclusion that employees cannot challenge collective bargaining agreements on antitrust grounds is not inconsistent with Supreme Court precedent.
Pennington, Jewel Tea, and Connell all involved employer or
product market competitor antitrust challenges to a union-employer agreement. Consequently, the Supreme Court never considered whether employees who are also party to an agreement may
challenge it.
195. One circuit court held, with neither citation nor explanation, that the nonstatutory exemption is for the benefit of employees only and is not available to protect acts of
employers except, perhaps, incidentally. See Carpenters Local Union No. 1846 v. PrattFarnsworth, Inc., 690 F.2d 489, 530 (5th Cir. 1982).
196. See Roberts, supra note 17, at 390-91, nn.217-20.
197. See, e.g., Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen v. Wetterau Foods,
Inc., 597 F.2d 133 (8th Cir. 1979).
198. See, e.g., A.L. Adams Constr. Co. v. Georgia Power Co., 557 F. Supp. 168, 172 n.4
(S.D. Ga. 1983)(holding that an employer may assert the nonstatutory labor exemption only
if the exemption would have been available to the corresponding union); Scooper Dooper,
Inc. v. Kraftco Corp., 494 F.2d 840, 847 n.14 (3d Cir. 1974); Mid America Regional Bargaining Assoc. v. Will County Carpenters District Council, 675 F.2d 881, 890 n.22 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 860, (1982).
199. Although the Supreme Court has instructed that exemptions from the antitrust
laws are to be narrowly construed, see Group Life & Health Ins. v. Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S.
205, 231 (1979), allowing the nonstatutory exemption to protect only unions would defeat
the exemption's purpose of encouraging collective bargaining.
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If federal labor policy is to be effective, the Wood decision is
probably appropriate. Its argument could be extended further to
also prohibit antitrust challenges by employers who are party to
the agreement. Such a result would be appropriate absent circumstances such as those in Jewel Tea, where the challenged terms
were agreed to by the employer because a bargaining unit got the
union to seek the same terms from the complaining employer. Employers party to an agreement should also be prohibited from making antitrust challenges. Collective bargaining incentives are undermined if parties on either side of an agreement are permitted to
subsequently attack it. Providing the exemption's protection to
both employers and unions will encourage collective bargaining.
At least one court has even extended the exemption to protect
a nonlabor, nonemployer group. In Burt v. Blue Shield,2 00 General

Motors (GM) and its employees made a nationwide collective bargaining agreement. The agreement provided for uniform health insurance benefits and put Blue Cross/Blue Shield (BC/BS) of Michigan in control of implementation. BC/BS of Michigan did not
actually insure GM workers outside of Michigan. Instead, it entered into agreements with other health insurance companies
across the nation to provide uniform benefits.0 1 A doctor sued BC/
BS of Michigan when two insurance companies who were party to
the plan refused to pay for a certain procedure. He alleged that the
uniform benefits agreement was an antitrust violation. 2 The court
rejected his claim, holding that the nonstatutory labor exemption
protected the insurance companies and the agreement. 03
The Supreme Court has not discussed the possibility that the
nonstatutory labor exemption might protect litigants other than an
employer or union.204 However, protection of third parties like insurance companies may-exceed the exemption's proper scope. The
nonstatutory exemption's only purpose is to encourage collective
bargaining between employers and organized labor. Accordingly, it
should be tailored narrowly to achieve only that purpose.
To extend the exemption to parties whose participation in the
collective bargaining process is minor or insignificant would be inconsistent with its purpose. Antitrust concerns often may outweigh
200. 591 F. Supp. 755 (S.D. Ohio 1984).
201. See id. at 759, 760-61.
202. 591 F. Supp. 755.
203. Id. at 762-63.
204. The Supreme Court has indicated that union combinations with nonlabor groups
are subject to greater scrutiny. See, e.g., Allen Bradley v. Local Union No. 3, IBEW, 325
U.S. 797 (1945); United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219 (1941).
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labor policy when agreements include nonlabor, nonemployer parties. The Supreme Court did not intend the nonstatutory labor exemption to protect product market restraints which would not be
protected by the statutory exemption.
5 and Allen
In Hutcheson""
Bradley208 the court plainly articulated its apprehension and mistrust of union agreements involving
outside, nonlabor groups.2 07 Any court, therefore, should approach
nonunion, nonemployer claims to the nonstatutory labor exemption's protection with a critical eye.
Third parties might appropriately claim the exemption's protection when their participation substantially promotes and facilitates collective bargaining. Such a determination would have to be
made on a case-by-case basis. The participation of insurance companies and possibly unions not party to the collective bargaining
agreement (but whose interests are to an extent promoted by the
bargaining union) 0 s may sometimes facilitate bargaining. At other
times, such involvement may not deserve protection.
The nonstatutory labor exemption should be available to both
unions and employers. Outside participants in the bargaining process should be permitted to avail themselves of the exemption's
protection only in limited circumstances. The nonstatutory exemption should not protect them unless their participation significantly promotes collective bargaining and no unreasonable product
market restrictions result.
B.

The Nonstatutory Labor Exemption Test

The courts struggled with the nonstatutory exemption in early
player restraint cases, commonly confusing it with the statutory
exemption. 0 9 In subsequent professional sports cases, however, the
courts have articulated a clear test to determine when to apply the
nonstatutory labor exemption.
The elements of the test were first set forth in dicta in Smith
v. Pro Football, Inc 2 1 Later, in Mackey v. NFL, 1' the Smith ele205. 312 U.S. 219 (1941).
206. 325 U.S. 797 (1945).
207. See supra note 196.
208. See Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local Union No. 100, 421
U.S. 616 (1975).
209. See, e.g., the discussions of Philadelphia World Hockey Club, Inc. v. Philadelphia
Hockey Club, Inc., supra notes 89-95 and accompanying text, and Robertson v. NBA, supra
notes 103-105 and accompanying text.
210. 420 F. Supp. 738 (D.D.C. 1976), afj'd in part & rev'd in part, 593 F.2d 1173 (D.C.
Cir. 1978). In Smith, a former NFL player whose career was shortened by a severe neck
injury sued the NFL and his former team. He alleged that the college draft was an illegal
conspiracy in restraint of trade.
211. 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. dismissed, 434 U.S. 801 (1977). In this case,
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ments were condensed and reorganized. The Mackey test is probably the clearest articulation of the nonstatutory exemption that
any court in any context has made. Every subsequent sports case2"
and several nonsports cases2"' have applied the Mackey test.
The Mackey test is a solid starting point for analyzing the exemption's application to any collective bargaining situation because it is a clear and accepted articulation of the nonstatutory
exemption. The Mackey test asks: (1) Does the challenged agreement primarily affect only the parties to the collective bargaining
agreement? 1 4 (2) Does the agreement relate to a mandatory subject of collective bargaining? 213 (3) Is the agreement embodied in a
formal collective bargaining agreement that is the product of bona
fide, arm's length bargaining? 1 6 The exemption applies if all three
questions are answered positively.
1.

PRIMARY EFFECT

The Mackey test's first requirement is merely a statement of
the antitrust policy disfavoring labor agreements intended to strike
at employers' product market competitors.2 17 This initial inquiry
denies protection to collusive agreements that aim to restrict product market competition.1 8 Courts have generally determined that
football players sued the NFL, alleging that the "Rozelle rule" concerning compensation for
teams losing players to free agency violated the antitrust laws. The parties eventually settled this case. See Reynolds v. NFL, 584 F.2d 280 (8th Cir. 1978).
212. See McCourt v. California Sports Inc., 600 F.2d 1193 (6th Cir. 1979); Wood v.
NBA, 602 F. Supp. 525 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); Zimmerman v. NFL, 632 F. Supp. 398 (D.D.C.
1986).
213. See, e.g., Burt v. Blue Shield, 591 F. Supp. 755 (S.D. Ohio 1984).
214. The court formulated this requirement from language in Connell Constr. Co. v.
Plumbers & Steamfitters Local Union No. 100, 421 U.S. 616 (1975), Local Union No. 189
Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676 (1965), and UMW v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965). Mackey,
543 F.2d at 614.
215. The court drew this aspect of the test from Jewel Tea, 381 U.S. 676 and Pennington, 381 U.S. 657. See 543 F.2d at 614.
216. The Mackey court derived this requirement from Jewel Tea, 381 U.S. 676, and
also referred to several sports cases, including Smith v. Pro Football, 420 F. Supp. 738
(D.D.C. 1976). See 543 F.2d at 614.
217. See, e.g., Apex Hosiery v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469 (1940); United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219 (1941); Allen Bradley v. Local Union No. 3, IBEW, 325 U.S. 797 (1945).
218. In Connell, the Supreme Court noted that a "direct restraint on the business
It contravenes antitrust policy, and
market has substantial anticompetitive effects ....
therefore cannot claim a nonstatutory exemption from the antitrust laws." 421 U.S. at 625.
Cf. Pennington, 381 U.S. at 664-65; Jewel Tea, 381 U.S. at 689-90 (opinion of White, J.); id.
at 709-13, 732-33 (opinion of Goldberg, J.).
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restraints on players' freedom of contract satisfy Mackey's first requirement.2 1 This characterization of the effect of player restraints is accurate so long as no one outside the multi-employer
bargaining unit is competing for the players' services. 220 Two other
groups merit discussion in the exemption context. Neither group,
however, should be permitted to penetrate the exemption's shield.
Consumers (spectators in sports cases) are one group typically
affected by labor agreements. InJewel Tea,2 21 the Supreme Court
protected an agreement which had a substantial impact on consumers' ability to purchase fresh meat. One commentator has argued that the Supreme Court's tolerance for adverse consumer effects undermines Mackey's "primary effect" requirement.2 2 2 Such
a contention is a misapprehension of the primary effect analysis.
Consumers will always suffer when unions succeed in negotiating fewer hours, higher wages, or better conditions. Prices will rise
because all three increase employer costs. Consumers, as well as or
sometimes instead of employers, will pay for higher union wages.
The exemption would rarely apply if effects on consumers
were considered. Only if an agreement restricted player wages or
mobility are consumers likely to benefit by an increase in consumer
surplus. Allen Bradley and Pennington made it clear that the Supreme Court's concern was union participation in schemes to destroy product market competition. Mackey's "primary effect" requirement, therefore, if focused on product market competitors, is
consistent with Supreme Court precedent. The requirement serves
to weed out labor agreements that exceed legitimate union
objectives.
Future employees (players) are also affected by labor agreements. The district court in Wood held that Mackey's "primary
219. Each professional league collectively bargains as a whole with all its players as a
whole. Consequently, collective bargaining agreements cannot easily be wielded by a club or
clubs to obtain an advantage over others. It is doubtful that clubs within a league, unless
within the same city, have any incentive to injure fellow clubs. The situation is drastically
altered when competing leagues arise.
220. Although some of the sports cases have involved suits brought by competing
leagues, see, e.g., USFL v. NFL, 644 F. Supp. 1040 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) and Philadelphia World
Hockey Club, Inc. v. Philadelphia Hockey Club, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 462 (E.D. Pa. 1972), most
have involved player challenges to club practices or league restrictions. In all leagues the
amount of product produced (sports exhibitions) is fixed. Major league baseball plays a 162
game schedule; the NBA plays an 82 game schedule; the NFL plays a 16 game schedule; and
the NHL plays a 75 game schedule. The number of games played is unaffected by changes
in player restraints. The clubs assert that player restraints are designed to improve product
quality by maintaining competitive balance.
221. 381 U.S. 676 (1965).
222. See J. WEISTART & C. LoWELL, supra note 1,at 581.
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effect" requirement is not concerned with effects on future players.223 Quite correctly, the court reasoned that its inquiry was limited to effects on an employer's (the league's) competitors.2 24 A
contrary conclusion could destroy the professional sports leagues'
college drafts. The Wood district court properly concluded that
considering future players would "turn federal labor policy on its
head."22
The preceding discussion suggests that Mackey's "primary effect" requirement should be limited to a consideration of effects on
product market competitors. That suggestion is consistent with the
Supreme Court's exemption cases. The employer's product market
competitors are the group most vulnerable to direct and substantial injury by labor agreements.
The foregoing analysis also suggests that the exemption of a
player restraint agreement may depend upon the existence or nonexistence of rival leagues (product market competitors). Such a result is entirely consistent with the antitrust policy of promoting
product market competition. In a sense, the Second Circuit's recent decision in Wood writes an even broader exemption.
In Wood, the Second Circuit endorsed the proposition that
current and future players cannot challenge collectively bargainedfor player restraints on antitrust grounds, regardless of product
market effects. The preceding "primary effect" analysis is consistent with Wood because Wood in no way restricts antitrust chal223. See Zimmerman v. NFL, 632 F. Supp. 398 (D.D.C. 1986). In Zimmerman, the
court rejected the player's argument that the exemption was not available to protect the
league's supplemental draft because the player was not part of the union when the draft was
negotiated. Accord Wood v. NBA, 602 F. Supp. 525 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). In Wood, the court
rejected a similar claim by an NBA player that the college draft primarily affected future
players not party to the bargaining process and therefore, was not entitled to the exemption.
The court quoted from two other cases in rejecting the player's argument. "When an employee is hired after the collective bargaining agreement has been made, the terms of [his]
employment already have been traded out." 602 F. Supp. at 528 (quoting J.1. Case Co. v.
NLRB, 321 U.S. 332, 335 (1944)). "The duty to bargain is a continuing one, and a union
may legitimately bargain over wages and conditions of employment which will affect employees who are to be hired in the future." 602 F. Supp. at 528 (quoting NLRB v. Laney and
Duke Storage Warehouse Co., 369 F.2d 859, 866 (5th Cir. 1966)). The Wood court concluded
that "[aft the time an agreement is signed between the owners and the players' exclusive
bargaining representative, all players within the bargaining unit and those who enter the
bargaining unit are bound by its terms." 602 F. Supp. at 529. Cf. Smith v. Pro Football Inc.,
420 F. Supp. 738, 744 (D.D.C. 1976) ("With regard to the fact that the boycott's impact is
on potential employees rather than on competitors of the employer, however, the court believes that the policies of the labor laws require that such an agreement be found to be
within the scope of the exemption to the antitrust laws.").
224. 602 F. Supp. at 529.
225. Id.
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lenges by rival leagues.
Primary effect analysis does not ordinarily present a serious
issue in player restraint cases. It could become more difficult, however, if a court were confronted with a collective bargaining agreement that contained provisions concerning television rights, minor
leagues, player endorsements, ticket prices, club relocation, or similar topics. Agreements on such subjects will impact on groups besides the players and the clubs. Ticket price and club relocation
restrictions may create direct product market effects. Agreements
concerning television rights and minor leagues, although less directly implicating the product market, may also affect a league's
actual or potential competitors.
Restrictions on player endorsements raise an interesting issue.
Such agreements would not affect a league's competitors but would
affect companies willing to hire players for promotional purposes.
Whether the nonstatutory exemption should protect agreements
affecting competitors in a product market different than the
league's has never been addressed."' s
From an economic perspective, there is no valid reason to automatically exempt or reject agreements impacting on other product markets. In a sense, advertisers and promoters are competitors
with sports leagues for players' non-athletic services. Primary effect analysis need not be limited to the immediate product market.
Incidental effects on other product markets should be ignored or
the exemption could never apply. But as the magnitude of such
effects increases, the justification for exemption decreases. The
question is one of degree. Courts should refrain from making
bright line characterizations of which product market effects merit
exemption.
If a collective bargaining agreement restricting player endorsements .or other pursuits is fundamental to insuring quality player
performance on the field (e.g., decreasing the risk of off-the-field
injuries), then courts should tolerate adverse effects on other product markets. But a restriction that is merely incidental to player
performance or has no valid relationship to performance is in a
different class. Agreements of that nature serve only to regulate
player conduct in furtherance of some antiquated notion of pro226. But see Fleer Corp. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 501 F. Supp. 485 (E.D. Pa.
1980), rev'd, 658 F.2d 139 (3d Cir. 1981) (holding Topps' individual licensing agreements
with each minor and major league baseball player, commercial authorization contracts between the players' union and the individual players, and renegotiation of the player's earlier
contracts with Topps neither unreasonable restraints of trade nor a conspiracy to attempt to
monopolize the baseball card market).
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tecting a sport's "integrity." They may unfairly restrict access to
players' non-athletic services, a subject of debatable concern to
employer clubs.
Consequently, courts should not ignore effects on product
markets other than the immediate one when performing primary
effect analysis. In light of the Wood decision, however, a challenge
to restraints having such an impact might have to be made by advertisers or promoters. Players would not have standing to attack
endorsement restrictions embodied in a collective bargaining
agreement, regardless of product market effects.
In conclusion, whether any particular provision concerning a
subject other than player restraints would satisfy the "primary effect" test depends on several considerations. Factors to consider
should include the provision's exact nature, the presence or absence of rival product market competitors, the directness or indirectness of product market effects, and the type of product market
or markets affected.
2.

MANDATORY BARGAINING SUBJECT

The Mackey test's second requirement is derived from Pennington'2 7 and Jewel Tea.2" 8 Those decisions both explicitly discussed the nonstatutory labor exemption's applicability in terms of
agreements concerning mandatory bargaining subjects. The Supreme Court made it clear, however, than an agreement is not exempt simply because it involves a mandatory subject. 2 9 The fact
that the agreement concerns a mandatory subject appears to be a
necessary, but not a sufficient, condition for employing the exemption's protection.
Section 8(d) of the National Labor Relations Act denotes
"wages, hours, and terms or conditions of employment" as
mandatory bargaining subjects.2 30 The inclusion of "terms or conditions of employment" leaves the determination of what is a
mandatory subject open to broad interpretation. In professional
sports cases, the question typically has been whether college drafts,
reserve systems and other player restraints constitute mandatory
bargaining subjects. Most courts confronted with various limitations on player freedom of contract have held them to be
227.
228.
229.
230.

381 U.S. 657.
381 U.S. 676.
381 U.S. at 664-65.
29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1982).
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is

logically

unsustainable.
A much more difficult characterization problem arises when a
court considers whether television rights, player endorsements, exhibition games, minor leagues, ticket prices, club relocation, and
similar topics are mandatory subjects of bargaining. Like primary
effect analysis, the question is really one of degree. Because restrictions on player endorsements and exhibition games affect player
earnings and working conditions, they probably also should be considered mandatory subjects.
Other topics are more difficult to characterize. Agreements
concerning minor leagues could affect players' working conditions.
Some players may spend time on both a minor league and a major
league club during the same season. Club relocation could affect a
player's working environment. However, because it has little effect
on wages or hours, it is a weaker case for a mandatory subject. No
court has ever had to characterize baseball's salary arbitration system. 2s2 However, because it plays an important role in determining
player salaries, it probably should be considered a mandatory bargaining subject.
Ticket prices, television rights, and revenue distribution are
probably not mandatory subjects. This is so even though television
revenues and ticket prices may affect player salaries because these
*factors influence club income. They are not, however, ordinarily as
closely related to wages, hours, and working conditions as the draft
or reserve system.233 In Jewel Tea, Justice White stated:
231. See Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 738 (D.D.C. 1976) (college draft is a
mandatory subject); Mackey v. NFL, 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976) (free agent compensation
system is a mandatory subject); McCourt v. California Sports, Inc., 600 F.2d 1193 (6th Cir.
1979) (free agent compensation system is a mandatory subject); Wood v. NBA, 602 F. Supp.
525 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (college draft, salary cap, and ban on player corporations are
mandatory subjects); Zimmerman v. NFL, 632 F. Supp. 398 (D.D.C. 1986) (supplemental
draft is a mandatory subject). See also Jacob & Winter, supra note 165. But cf. Robertson v.
NBA, 389 F. Supp. 867 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (basketball reserve system is not a mandatory subject). Robertson is the exception rather than the rule. Courts should follow the approach
that restrictions on players' freedom of contract concern mandatory subjects and are properly resolved in the collective bargaining context. See Reynolds v. NFL, 584 F.2d 280 (8th
Cir. 1978).
232. Baseball has used a salary arbitration system since 1974 for players and clubs
who cannot agree on a salary for the coming season. Each side submits a final offer to an
arbitrator approved by both sides. Each side then gets to present evidence and argue in
favor of its offer at a hearing. The arbitrator must then choose one of the offers; he cannot
split the difference or calculate a new salary. The offer he chooses is the player's salary for
the next season. See Basic Agreement, infra note 265, at 9-13.
233. The NBA salary cap is an exception because it ties team salary levels to the
NBA's gross revenues. See Wood, 809 F.2d at 957.
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Jewel, for example, need not have bargained about or agreed to
a schedule of prices at which its meat would be sold and the
unions could not legally have insisted that it do so. . . .[1]f the
unions had made such a demand, Jewel had agreed and . . . an
injured party had challenged the agreement . . . we seriously
doubt that either the unions or Jewel could claim immunity by
reason of the labor exemption .... ."
From an economic perspective, a union employer agreement to
raise prices and an agreement to raise wages are similar in effect.
Both cause prices to increase. One merely does so more directly
and visibly than the other. For policy reasons, however, the distinction is relevant. Unions should not be allowed to manage an
employer's business directly through price setting in a collective
bargaining agreement.
Only those subjects essential to promoting collective bargaining should be considered mandatory subjects. It is not necessary to
protect agreements on television revenue distribution or ticket
prices to encourage collective bargaining between the players and
clubs. Most restrictions on the players conceivably involve
mandatory subjects of bargaining. The characterization, however,
becomes more difficult as the subject more directly implicates the
product market.
One rather illogical, but related, issue which has arisen is
whether illegal agreements concerning mandatory subjects can be
exempt. Some courts have held that an agreement which violates
the antitrust laws cannot be considered a mandatory subject. " 5
Other courts have refused to acknowledge an agreement that constitutes an unfair labor practice as concerning a mandatory
subject.2" 6
In Smith v. Pro Football, Inc.,23 7 the district court declined to
apply the nonstatutory labor exemption because it determined
234. 381 U.S. at 689.
235. See Mackey, 407 F. Supp. at 1009-10.
236. See Consolidated Express, Inc. v. New York Shipping Assoc., Inc., 602 F.2d 494,
519 (3d Cir. 1979) (any clause in a collective bargaining agreement which violates section
8(e) (unfair labor practice) of the National Labor Relations Act cannot be protected by the
nonstatutory labor exemption). The court created a limited defense to damages actions even
if the agreement violated section 8(e). The court held that if a defendant could show that
upon entering an agreement, it was not foreseeable that the agreement would later be held
illegal, the defendant would be absolved of liability for money damages but remained subject to injunctive relief. 602 F.2d at 521. See also Schnabel v. Building and Constr. Trades
Council, 563 F. Supp. 1030 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (following Consolidated).
237. 420 F. Supp. 738 (D.D.C. 1976), afl'd in part & rev'd in part, 593 F.2d 1173 (D.C.
Cir. 1978).

Published by Institutional Repository, 1987

39

University of Miami Entertainment & Sports Law Review, Vol. 4, Iss. 2 [1987], Art. 4

322

ENTERTAINMENT & SPORTS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 4:283

that the agreement violated the antitrust laws. 238 The Mackey

court properly rejected that illogical and circular argument. 239 The
nonstatutory exemption's purpose is to promote collective bargaining by protecting some agreements that might otherwise be illegal
under the antitrust laws. Thus, a court should first determine
whether or not the nonstatutory exemption applies before examining a collective bargaining agreement's antitrust legality. It should
not treat an agreement's antitrust legality as a preliminary
question.
An agreement constituting an unfair labor practice, however,
is on different footing. Because the National Labor Relations Act
makes unfair labor practices illegal, they are contrary to national
labor policy. The nonstatutory labor exemption is designed to promote federal labor policy. Allowing it to protect unfair labor practices would destroy the very policy it is intended to further.
Unions are unlikely to agree to an unfair labor practice unless
a strong employer forces it upon them. In that situation, bona fide
collective bargaining is not occurring. The nonstatutory labor exemption serves no legitimate purpose by protecting agreements
reached under such circumstances. Therefore, agreements constituting unfair labor practices should not be held to concern
mandatory bargaining subjects.
At least one commentator has suggested that Mackey's
mandatory subject requirement is too restrictive. 40 The argument
for extension is that the expansion of protected subjects Would encourage collective bargaining on more topics. For nonstatutory exemption purposes, the question is whether extending the exemption to agreements concerning non-mandatory subjects would serve
national labor policy more than it would hinder antitrust policy.
Possible advantages from extending the exemption to nonmandatory subjects have largely been undermined by the Wood
decision. First, Wood moots Mackey's mandatory subject requirement in player suits. Second, Wood protects collective bargaining
agreements on all subjects, whether mandatory or not, from player
(employee) challenge. The requirement's justification is further
weakened when one realizes that a product market competitor is
unlikely to bring suit unless an agreement would also fail Mackey's
238.
statutory
appeal.
239.
1009-10).
240.

See 420 F. Supp. 738. Because the NFL did not appeal the district court's nonexemption conclusion, the D.C. Circuit had no reason to address the issue on
See Mackey, 543 F.2d at 615 (rejecting trial court's findings at 407 F. Supp. at
See J. WEISTART & C. LowEu, supra note 1, at 581-82 nn.594-95.
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primary effect requirement. A competitor is likely to sue only if it
is injured. Consequently, anticompetitive agreements on nonmandatory subjects are unlikely to be insulated from product market
competitor attacks, regardless of whether or not a mandatory subject requirement is adopted.
Possible justifications for the requirement do exist. For example, the mandatory subject requirement serves as an extra check on
union or employer temptations to enter collusive agreements
designed to unreasonably restrict product market competition.
Also, by helping to insure that legitimate union interest in a matter exists, the requirement may minimize the frustration of antitrust policy. That result is consistent with Supreme Court precedent warning that antitrust exemptions should be narrowly
construed.2 4 Finally, the requirement may narrow the exemption
without hindering labor policy. Exempting agreements on nonmandatory subjects would not with absolute certainty significantly increase incentives to collectively bargain.
The preceding discussion illustrates that Wood obviates the
need for a mandatory subject requirement in protecting agreements from employee challenges. The requirement, however, may
serve as notice to employers and unions not to stray too far afield
in negotiations. At the very least, the presence of a mandatory subject demonstrates the strength of union-employer interests.
3.

FORMAL AGREEMENT-BONA FIDE BARGAINING

The Mackey test's third line of inquiry may be split into two
parts: first, the formal agreement requirement and second, the
bona fide bargaining determination.
The two inquiries are related but distinct. The formal agreement requirement attempts to minimize the chance that a strong
employer will unilaterally impose restrictions on a union. If restrictions or provisions embodied in a formal document are more likely
the result of actual bargaining than those not formally memorialized, then the requirement arguably creates at least the potential
for actual bargaining.
The bona fide bargaining requirement goes one step further. It
extends the inquiry beyond what might have occurred to what actually did occur. Although courts have used the bona fide bargaining requirement to strike down player restraints, it is by far the
241.

See Group Life & Health Ins. v. Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S. 205, 231 (1979).
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most controversial and criticized element of the Mackey test.242
The bona fide bargaining requirement serves two distinct purposes. First, courts have used it to guard against restrictions unilaterally imposed by the leagues in player restraint cases. Used in
this way, the requirement protects weak unions with little bargaining power. Second, the requirement can be used to deny protection
to collusive union-employer agreements designed to restrict product market competition. This is arguably the only manner in which
the Supreme Court recognizes this requirement.24
a.

Formal Collective Bargaining Agreement

The following discussion will expand upon the propriety of the
two parts of Mackey's third element. The Mackey court held that
the nonstatutory labor exemption could not apply unless the challenged agreement was embodied in a formal collective bargaining
agreement.2 " The court derived this limitation from language in
Pennington and Jewel Tea. Those opinions, however, at most only
hint that the exemption is limited to formal agreements. Likewise,
in Connell, the Supreme Court did not specify whether the exemption only applied to formal agreements.2 4 5 The Mackey court's interpretation is not necessarily contrary to Supreme Court precedent because a formal agreement already existed the only time the
Court applied the exemption.2 4 6
Other courts have not required a formal collective bargaining
agreement. Instead, they required only that the challenged agreement or activity arise in the course of the bargaining relation242. See, e.g., Roberts, supra note 17, at 402-05.
243. In Pennington, the Supreme Court denied the exemption because the union had
colluded with employers to inflict harm on product market competitors, not because the
employers forced restrictions on the union. See UMW v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965).
Likewise, in Jewel Tea, the Court exempted the agreement because the union did not collude with employers but sought only to further its own interests. See Local Union No. 189
Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676 (1965).
244. Mackey, 543 F.2d at 614. Several subsequent cases have followed this requirement. See, e.g., Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 738 (D.D.C. 1976), affirmed in part
and reversed in part, 593 F.2d 1173 (D.C. Cir. 1978); McCourt v. California Sports Inc., 460
F. Supp. 904 (E.D. Mich. 1978), rev'd, 600 F.2d 1193 (6th Cir. 1979), Wood v. NBA, 602 F.
Supp. 525 (S.D.N.Y. 1984), aff'd, 809 F.2d 954 (2d Cir. 1987); Carpenters Local Union No.
1846 v. Pratt-Farnsworth, Inc., 690 F.2d 489, 530-31 (5th Cir. 1982); Altemose Constr. Co. v.
Atlantic, Cape May and Parts of Burlington, Ocean and Cumberland Counties Building
Trades Council, 493 F. Supp. 1181 (D.N.J. 1984), rev'd and remanded, 751 F.2d 653 (3d Cir.
1985).
245. 421 U.S. at 624-25.
246. Jewel Tea, 381 U.S. 676, is the only case in which the Supreme Court found the
exemption applicable.
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ship.2 Although language in Connell might support that position,2 8 the exemption's scope should be limited to formal
collective bargaining agreements in the professional sports context.
A formal agreement requirement increases the likelihood that the
parties will actually bargain over an agreement's terms. Agreements limiting players' freedom of contract pose little danger of
player-club collusion to achieve an unlawful product market
restriction.
Professional sports clubs have a strong bargaining position because players often have no other market for their athletic skills.
As a consequence, leagues have a history of unilaterally imposing
restrictions on the players.2 4 Applying the exemption only to formal collective bargaining agreements better insures players the op2 50
portunity to actually bargain over any restrictions.
Requiring a formal agreement encourages employers to bargain because restrictions not embodied in a collective bargaining
agreement may be subject to antitrust attack. Although the Wood
decision prohibits employee antitrust attacks on formal collective
bargaining agreements, the court did not indicate that it would extend its holding to preclude all employee antitrust suits, including
those against informal agreements. 25 1 In theory, such an extension
would allow employers to unilaterally impose player restraints
without fear of player lawsuits, even though it is unlikely that the
leagues could do so today. The player unions are now stronger and
not averse to going on strike. As a result, the formal agreement
requirement may be of limited value in protecting employee interests. Nevertheless, the requirement still serves to protect an employer's product market competitors.
The requirement helps to insure that the exemption will be
applied only when labor policy concerns are strong. It discourages
247. See Zimmerman, 632 F. Supp. at 404-05; Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Wetterau
Foods, Inc., 597 F.2d 133 (8th Cir. 1979); Plumbers & Steanfitters Local 598 v. Morris, 511
F. Supp. 1298 (E.D. Wash. 1981) (nonstatutory labor exemption used to protect an employer
"lockout" because it was part of the bargaining process).
248. See Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local No. 100, 421 U.S. 616,
626 (1975).
249. See J. WEISTART & C. LOWELL, supra note 1; J. DWORKIN, OWNERS VERSUS PLAYEn (1981).
250. Most restrictions on baseball players are embodied in the leagues' formal collective bargaining agreement. In baseball, the only restraints not embodied in the collective
bargaining agreement are the Major League Rules which are unilaterally issued by the commissioner and govern many facets of player conduct. However, because these rules are incorporated by reference into the formal agreement, the players can apparently make the rules a
bargaining issue, especially if the rules concern mandatory subjects.
251. See Wood, 809 F.2d at 962.
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employers from trying to involve unions in informal agreements for
the purpose of injuring the employer's competitors. The National
Labor Relations Acts2 2 and the statutory exemption will protect
most conduct that is not embodied in a formal agreement that occurs in the course of a bargaining relationship, making the nonstatutory exemption's protection unnecessary. The nonstatutory labor
exemption's propriety wanes as its protection is stretched beyond
formal agreements. Therefore, the exemption should be narrowly
construed in order to encourage formal collective bargaining and to
protect product market competitors. 5 3
b.

Bona Fide Arm's Length Bargaining

In addition to limiting the nonstatutory labor exemption to
formal agreements, the Mackey court required that the agreement
be the result of bona fide, arm's length bargaining.2 54 In player restraint cases, some courts rely on the bona fide bargaining inquiry
to deny the nonstatutory exemption's protection to the leagues."5
These courts typically determine that the leagues unilaterally imposed restrictions on young and weak players' unions.2 56 Recent
player restraint cases, however, demonstrate a reluctance to scrutinize the bargaining process by not stressing Mackey's final requirement. Instead, the courts have been satisfied with a determination
that both sides received some quid pro quo in the bargaining
252. See generally 29 U.S.C. §§ 157, 158, 163 (1982) (protecting certain types of
strikes, boycotts, picketing, and lockouts).
253. An agreement concerning subjects such as television revenues or ticket prices
clearly must be embodied in a formal agreement to even merit consideration for exemption.
If the nonstatutory labor exemption serves labor policy in protecting such agreements, it
does so only to the extent that protecting them encourages the union and employer to participate in the formal bargaining process. Outside the professional sports context, a less restrictive application of the exemption may be appropriate. The exemption issue most frequently arises when a union-employer agreement impacts on the employer's competitors.
One commentator managed to dig up only one non-sports case in which an agreement imposed restraints solely on the labor market. See Roberts, supra note 17, at 339 n.4. Therefore, restraints on players' freedom of contract present a unique situation. Union-employer
collusion to effect anticompetitive goals is far more likely in a non-sports industry. Regardless, the Mackey primary effect analysis coupled with the formal collective bargaining agreement requirement may provide a workable standard for all industries, not just professional
sports.
254. 543 F.2d at 614. This requirement is based on the plurality's opinions in Pennington and Jewel Tea.
255. See 543 F.2d at 615-16; Philadelphia World Hockey Club v. Philadelphia Hockey
Club, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 462 (E.D. Pa. 1972); Boston Prof. Hockey Ass'n v. Cheevers, 348 F.
Supp. 261 (D. Mass. 1972), remanded, 472 F.2d 127 (1st Cir. 1972).
256. See Mackey, 543 F.2d at 615-16.
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process.2 57
The bona fide bargaining aspect of the Mackey court's nonstatutory labor exemption test is entirely inappropriate. The primary effect requirement eliminates pure product market restrictions from the exemption's coverage. Consequently, further inquiry
into the bargaining process is an unreasonable judicial intrusion.
The Supreme Court cases establishing the exemption do not
support Mackey's final requirement. For example, in Pennington,
the Court's discussion of bona fide bargaining was understandable
because factually, such bargaining had not occurred.26 8 Although in
Jewel Tea the Court examined the trial court's findings on the
parties' bargaining record, the decision ultimately turned on the
agreement's reasonableness, not on whether it was the result of
bona fide bargaining.2 59
Player unions are unlikely to collude with clubs to restrict
their own freedom of contract. Nor are they likely to capitulate to
league demands without extracting some reciprocal benefit. To do
so would not be in their self interest. Wood's rejection of player
challenges represents judicial recognition of the impropriety of
probing into the bargaining process. Judicial inquiry into the bargaining process is simply an unwarranted intrusion.
Justice Goldberg, in both Pennington and Jewel Tea, recognized the implications of judicial inquiry into the bargaining process. He argued that "Congress intended to foreclose judges and
juries from roaming at large in the area of collective bargaining...
by inquiry into the purpose and motive of the employer and union
bargaining on mandatory subjects .... "1260 He believed that any
attempted inquiry into the parties' motives and purposes was "totally artificial." '' Justice Goldberg warned that allowing courts to
substitute their own strategies for those of the bargaining parties
would have a counterproductive effect on collective bargaining.
As a practical matter, effectively and accurately ascertaining
the bargaining parties' motives and purposes is nearly impossible.
Frequently, the bargaining process does not provide much hard evidence concerning the parties' good faith. In fact, good faith bargaining is not equated with making concessions. The National Labor Relations Act does not require the parties to yield ground in
257. See McCourt v. California Sports Inc., 600 F.2d at 1193, 1203 (6th Cir. 1979);
Zimmerman v. NFL, 632 F. Supp. 398, 406-07 (D.D.C. 1976).
258. See UMW v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965).
259. See Local Union No. 189 v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676 (1965).
260. Jewel Tea, 381 U.S. at 716 (Goldberg, J. concurring).
261. Id. at 719-20.
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collective bargaining.2 62 As a result, courts should not hold employers hostage to union demands by requiring them to compromise or
show evidence of "bona fide" bargaining.
Justice Goldberg predicted that a good faith requirement
would force a union or employer to publicly resist their opponent's
demands, even if approving of the terms.2 63 Such resistance would
be necessary in order to have evidence of noncollusion. Without
evidence of noncollusion, an agreement would be vulnerable. Justice Goldberg convincingly argued that courts should not be permitted to infer illegal motives whenever a collective bargaining
agreement exists. He contended that allowing them to do so would
only encourage noncooperation and hinder national labor policy.2
Justice Goldberg was correct. The primary effect requirement
protects product market competitors against agreements intended
to restrict product market competition. The formal agreement and
mandatory subject requirements protect unions by insuring that
only agreements over which a union has actually had an opportunity to bargain may be exempted. These requirements make the
bona fide bargaining requirement unnecessary as a means of effectuating national labor policy.
In the professional sports context, the bona fide bargaining requirement is unnecessary to protect players. Player unions are no
longer young nor so weak. They have negotiated substantial
changes in their freedom to market their services in various
leagues. 2 65 Leagues no longer simply force restrictions on players.
Although the Wood decision has broader ramifications, it stands,
at least in part, as a recognition of the players' bargaining power.
The bona fide bargaining requirement is also unnecessary to
protect product market competition. In the sports industries, the
quantity of output (games) is strictly limited and all clubs bargain
as a unit. Therefore, no club attempts to drive others out of its
league. Players would gain nothing by helping to eliminate clubs or
262. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) directs that "such obligation [to bargain collectively] does not
compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession ...
"
263. Justice Goldberg articulated his fear as follows: "An employer will be forced to
take a public stand against a union's wage demands, even if he is willing to accept them, lest
a too ready acceptance be used by a jury to infer an agreement between the union and
employer that the same wages will be sought from other employers." Jewel Tea, 381 U.S. at
720-21.
264. See Jewel Tea, 381 U.S. at 697.
265. All professional sports leagues now have some form of free agency. Baseball has
both free agency and salary arbitration. See Basic Agreement Between the American League
of Professional Baseball Clubs and the National League of Baseball Clubs and the Major
League Baseball Players Association at 9-13, 42-47 (1985).
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even competing leagues.2 66
The bona fide bargaining inquiry is not necessary to prevent
the nonstatutory labor exemption from sheltering agreements on
subjects such as television revenues or ticket prices. Agreements on
those and similar subjects affect groups outside the bargaining relationship. As a result, the primary effect test would defeat their
claims to the exemption. A bona fide bargaining inquiry is unjustifiable in the professional sports arena 21 7 and may not be desirable
in other contexts either.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The nonstatutory labor exemption is necessary to and effective
in harmonizing conflicting antitrust and labor policies. When properly formulated and applied, the exemption encourages collective
bargaining without severely hindering the antitrust laws' effectiveness. The exemption, however, frequently has been misunderstood
and misapplied. The Supreme Court, itself, has considered it on
only three occasions. Even then, the Court reached only limited
agreement on the exemption's boundaries. Consequently, lower
courts have differed in determining the exemption's applicability.
This has been particularly true in the professional sports player
restraint cases.
The recent Wood decision, however, may eliminate the need
for detailed analysis and complex inquiry in player restraint cases.
In Wood, the court held that players can never challenge collective
bargaining agreements on antitrust grounds. That holding, if followed by other circuits or upheld by the Supreme Court, will
sound the death knell for player antitrust cases. The Wood result
is consistent with the nonstatutory exemption's purpose of encouraging collective bargaining, but it obviates the need for judicial assessment of the nonstatutory exemption when players bring suit.
Wood does not foreclose the possibility that competing leagues
or other competitors for player services may challenge player restraints on antitrust grounds. In those situations, the nonstatutory
labor exemption remains relevant. Nor does Wood slam the door
on player challenges based on grounds other than the antitrust
laws. Players may, however, have to seek new legal theories or perhaps, turn against their union. For example, players might allege
that their union failed its duty of fair representation by acquiesc266. More teams within a league and more competing leagues will increase competition for player services, increasing player salaries.
267. See supra note 23.
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ing to player restraints. Regardless of the direction player restraint
cases take following Wood, the nonstatutory exemption retains validity in the sports arena.
This article has attempted to assess the nonstatutory labor exemption as developed in the professional sports player restraint
cases. That evaluation was guided by reference to the exemption's
purpose and the Supreme Court cases that established it. The results of that assessment can be summarized in the following proposed three part test for the nonstatutory labor exemption's application: (1) Does the challenged agreement or term primarily affect
only the parties to the collective bargaining relationship? (2) Does
it concern a mandatory subject of bargaining? (3) Is the challenged
provision embodied in a formal collective bargaining agreement?
The exemption's umbrella should shelter any agreement that
satisfies all three standards. This proposed test was derived by assessing the weaknesses of the professional sports cases' analysis. It
also reflects and is consistent with Supreme Court precedent on
the nonstatutory labor exemption. The test serves the nonstatutory exemption's purpose of promoting collective bargaining while
minimizing the frustration of antitrust policy. Although meeting
the unique needs of the professional sports industries, it may also
be appropriate for other industries as well. The proposed test is
also consistent with Wood. Even if a court rejected Wood and continued to apply the exemption to cases brought by players, agreements concerning player restraints would nearly always satisfy the
proposed test.
The primary effect requirement is supported by over forty
years of Supreme Court precedent. It serves to protect against
union-employer agreements solely intended to injure the employer's competitors. The mandatory subject requirement limits
the exemption's protection to agreements over which national labor policy requires collective bargaining. It insures that the nonstatutory labor exemption may apply only when labor policy considerations are very strong.
The formal bargaining agreement requirement insures that the
exemption is available only for agreements over which the parties
have actually had an opportunity to bargain. No inquiry into the
agreement's reasonableness or whether bona fide bargaining has
occurred is necessary or desirable. Judicial inquiry into those areas
serves only to create practical and legal problems while frustrating
the exemption's purpose.
The nonstatutory labor exemption does serve a role in professional sports litigation. That role is changing, however, and should
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change even more. Courts should rely on the exemption's primary
effect and mandatory subject requirements to refuse protection to
unworthy agreements. Courts should not inquire into the bargaining process.
This article also has occasionally considered the possibility
that the nonstatutory labor exemption would protect collective
bargaining agreements concerning topics other than player restraints. Agreements on topics such as player endorsements, minor
leagues, and exhibition games probably concern mandatory bargaining subjects. However, they also have an impact on groups
outside the bargaining relationship. The nonstatutory exemption's
umbrella may not be expansive enough to protect them.
Agreements on topics such as television rights, ticket prices,
revenue allocation, expansion clubs, club relocation, and resale
rights for videotaped games are even less likely candidates for the
exemption's protection. They impact directly on product markets.
They are also likely to injure those not party to the collective bargaining agreement. Television rights and ticket prices may not
even be mandatory bargaining subjects. Courts have not needed to
address such situations but as professional sports become increasingly commercialized the possibilities increase.
Due to the player cases of the early 1970's and the increasing
strength of players' unions, professional athletes are no longer the
slaves of their employers. Perhaps player unions have not yet
reached the promised land, but they can see it on the horizon.
Accordingly, the nonstatutory labor exemption should not be
contorted and mangled to serve notions of fairness that are no
longer consistent with reality. The courts should stop trying to call
every "ball" and "strike" and let the leagues and players 'play
ball'!
Stephen R. McAllister
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